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Abstract

This master’s thesis examines the issues that surround the practice of Direct to
Physician (DTP) marketing by pharmaceutical companies. The thesis begins by looking
at the normative foundations that ground objections to DTP marketing. Developments
that have recently emerged in contemporary Kantian ethics are utilized in order to defend
a Kantian moral framework. The first and second formulations of the categorical
imperative are then utilized in order to derive four mid level principles that serve to guide
the discussion through the following chapters.
Chapter 3 criticizes DTP marketing as deceptive and manipulative and argues that
is strongly correlated to negative affects on prescribing behavior, both harming patient
care and undermining the fiduciary duties physicians owe their patients. As such, DTP
marketing does not show the proper respect patients and physicians are owed as moral
agents.
Chapter 4 considers the economic impact of DTP marketing. Indications suggest
that DTP marketing is primarily utilized to create an artificial market for “me-too” drugs.
As these drugs are often very expensive and offer little to no therapeutic benefit over
existing alternatives they drive up health care spending. When understood within the
context of a failing health care system it becomes a self defeating business strategy and
harms patients through rising health care costs.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the potential for the industry to
regulate itself and examines the likely impact regulation of DTP marketing will have on
the industry. While a voluntary ban is called for, financial incentives make it unlikely
ii

that self regulation will be sufficient. In which case, it will be the responsibility of state
or federal governments to regulate the practices. While regulation of DTP marketing
may threaten profitability of the industry it is claimed that the current reliance on “metoo” drugs entails that the primary affect of regulation will be to force pharmaceutical
companies to concentrate on truly innovative drugs. As such, contrary to the claims of
critics, regulation will likely encourage innovation as opposed to stifling it.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

We owe a great deal to the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies
have developed treatments that have not only dramatically improved our quality of life
but that save lives. The introduction of antibiotics has led to a reduction in mortality
rates from rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease of 83%. ACE inhibitors, beta
blockers, and nitrates have aided in lowering the mortality rate from atheroscierosis by
74%. 1 Pharmaceuticals are also at least partially responsible for the dramatic rise in life
expectancy from 68.2 years in 1950 2 to 77.8 in 2006. 3
There is even strong evidence that for certain conditions, pharmaceuticals are the
most cost effective means for the treatment of disease. Pharmaceuticals can help to
minimize hospital stays and physician interactions, both of which are extremely
expensive treatment options. Frank Lichtenberg has argued that $1.00 spent on
pharmaceutical drugs can be correlated with a $3.65 reduction in health care spending. 4
While there is reason to be concerned that Lichtenberg’s analysis is selective and only
holds for certain treatments, it is still important to recognize that at least some
pharmaceutical therapies do lead to significant reductions in health care expenditures.

1

Masia, Neal A. “Pharmaceutical Innovation: Lowering the Price of Good Health,” Economic Realities in
Health Care Policy, 2, no. 2, (2002) http://www.heartland.org/pdf/3264bd.pdf, 8 (accessed 3/22/07).
2
National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports, 54, no. 19, June 28, 2006,
Infoplease, “Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930-2004,”
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html (accessed 3/22/07).
3
U.S. Census Bureau Data, Infoplease, “Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy for Selected Countries,
2006,” http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004393.html (accessed 3/22/07)
4
Lichtenberg, Frank R. “The Economic Benefits of New Drugs,” Economic Realities in Health Care
Policy, 2, no. 2, (2001), 14-19.
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Yet, despite these incredible successes, the pharmaceutical industry continues to
come under sustained criticism for many of its practices. For decades the industry has
consistently been one of the most profitable in America. At the same time, health care
spending continues to outpace growth of the economy at an alarming rate, steadily
consuming ever greater portions of our GDP. This trend raises questions over the
appropriateness of such profits. However, the industry defends their substantial profits
by arguing that the pharmaceutical industry is inherently risky and substantial profits are
necessary to encourage the investment necessary for continued innovation. Thus, if we
wish to continue to benefit from the incredible developments that the pharmaceutical
industry has brought us, then we must not endanger their ability to sustain profits at their
current levels.
One of the primary mechanisms by which the pharmaceutical industry maintains
such high profits is through their immense investment in marketing, nearly $20 billion in
2003. While spending on direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) continues to grow
dramatically, it remains a relatively small percentage of total advertising spending, only
21.9% in 2003. The remaining 78.1% or roughly $15.6 billion is spent on direct to
physician (DTP) marketing. 5 While such huge expenditures within the context of a
health care industry struggling to survive should certainly raise eyebrows, it is not in

5

Lam, Michael D., “A $20 Billion Bill and Plenty of Change,” Pharmaceutical Executive, Sept., (2004),
http://www.imshealth.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_40000873/48/36/70684838PE012204ePlentyofChange.pd
f (accessed 3/22/07). It is exceedingly difficult to determine precisely what is spent on marketing by
pharmaceutical companies. There is a disturbing lack of transparency in the public documentation of their
spending. SEC filings by pharmaceutical companies lump marketing, advertising, and administration into a
single group making it difficult in the extreme to determine exactly how much is being spent and on what.
These technicalities are what lies behind the significant differences that often exist in attempts to estimate
marketing expenditures by the industry and where that money is directed.

2

itself reason to charge pharmaceutical companies with unethical conduct. They are still a
business, and as such, have a right to pursue profit.
However, it is the tactics and methods that the pharmaceutical industry employs
in their marketing endeavors that raise the most concern. In particular, interactions with
physicians and health care professionals seem most worrisome. Accounts of these
interactions abound, and are characterized by the showering of small trinkets, buying of
meals, all expense paid trips to conferences on continued medical education (CME)
which are themselves sponsored by pharmaceutical companies and serve to highlight
their newest and greatest products, enrollment of physicians as drug company-sponsored
consultants, advisory board members, and public speakers, and many other debatable
practices. 6 While there have been efforts to limit, discourage, and outright ban many of
the most worrisome practices by the American Medical Association (AMA), PhARMA
6

Abrams, Thomas. “The Regulation of Prescription Drug Promotion.” In Ethics and the Pharmaceutical
Industry, eds. Michael A. Santoro and Thomas M. Gorrie; Allman, Richard L., M.D. “The Relationships
Between Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ethical Problems with the Every-Day Conflict of
Interest.” Health care Ethics Committee Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 155-70; Angell, Marcia M.D. The Truth
About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What To Do About It. New York: Random House,
2004; Dana, Jason, MS; George Lowenstein, PhD. “A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians
From Industry.” JAMA 290, no. 2 (2003): 252-255; Elliot, Carl. “The Drug Pushers.” The Atlantic
Monthly April (2006): 2-13; Freeman, Jerome W., MD, FACP and Brian Kaatz PharmD. “The Physician
and the Pharmaceutical Detail Man: An Ethical Analysis.” The Journal of Medical Humanities and
Bioethics 8, no. 1 (1987): 34-9; Griffith, David. “Reasons for Not Seeing Drug Representatives.” BMJ
319, no. 10 (1999): 69-70; Human, Delon. “Conflicts of Interest in Science and Medicine: The Physician’s
Perspective.” Science and Engineering Ethics 8, no. 3 (2002): 273-276; Katz, Dana, Arthur L. Caplan, and
Jon F. Merz. “All Gifts Large and Small: Toward an Understand of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry
Gift-Giving.” The American Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 3 (2003): 39-46; Lexchin, Joel. “Doctors and
Detailers: Therapeutic Education or Pharmaceutical Promotion?” International Journal of Health Services
19, no. 4 (1989): 663-79; Relman, Arnold S., MD. “Defending Professional Independence: ACCME’s
Proposed New Guidelines for Commercial Support of CME.” JAMA 289, no. 18 (2003): 2418-20; Reuter,
Lars, PhD. “The Ethics of Advertising Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Ethics & Medicine; A
Christian Perspective on Issues in Bioethics 19, no. 3 (2003): 171-5; Rodwin, Marc A. Medicine, Money,
and Morals: Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Tsai, Alexander
C. “Policies to Regulate Gifts to Physicians From Industry.” JAMA 290, no. 13 (2003): 1776; Wazana,
Ashley, MD. “Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?” JAMA 283, no. 3
(2000): 373-380; Ziegler, Michael G., MD; Pauline Lew, PharmD; Brian C. Singer, PharmD. “The
Accuracy of Drug Information From Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives.” JAMA 273, no. 16 (1995),
1296-8.

3

(the trade group that represents the pharmaceutical industry), and even through
government legislation, there is still concern that these practices continue to undermine
the practice of medicine.
Critics of DTP marketing argue that the practice damages the patient physician
relationship. There is serious concern that the influence of pharmaceutical sales
representatives (PSR’s) interferes with physicians’ ability to make proper prescribing
decisions that are in the best interests of their patients. If this concern is well founded
then not only does this threaten to harm the patient physician relationship but also puts
the health and wellbeing of patients at risk. Even more, there is serious concern that
within the context of a struggling health care industry, the practice of DTP marketing
needlessly drives up health care spending by encouraging the prescribing of newer, more
expensive products that have little or no advantage over existing treatments.
The pharmaceutical industry defends DTP marketing practices by arguing that
pharmaceutical detailing serves a valuable educative role. They claim that they provide
accurate, unbiased information to physicians that help them to make better prescribing
decisions. Further, the practice of buying meals is defended as merely a way to most
effectively use the very valuable and limited time physicians have. Physicians must eat,
so why not use that time to educate them about a new product and purchase their meal as
compensation for the time spent with them? Above all else, the pharmaceutical industry
is just that, an industry. Thus, it seems wrong to unnecessarily limit their pursuit of profit
through the most effective marketing mechanism at their disposal. Finally, even if we do
find solid moral objections to the practices that surround DTP marketing, we must

4

carefully consider the implications of any reform we wish to enact, less we limit the
industry’s ability to continue to develop innovative, life saving therapies.
Yet, much of what has been written in objection to the practice of DTP marketing
has been authored by physicians. While their firsthand experience and proximity to the
practices is invaluable, often the discussion lacks a firm foundation upon which
objections may be grounded. What has resulted is a debate in which both sides talk past
each other. Physicians argue from the standpoint of patient care while the pharmaceutical
companies argue from the standpoint of sustainability and profitability. The problem
then becomes one of explaining why patient care should win out over considerations of
profitability and sustainability. Without a clearly articulated ethical framework to argue
from, this becomes a daunting task in which each side believes their point of view should
win out over the opposing side. However, by grounding these objections in a Kantian
framework we may begin to see why concerns of patient care and the unhindered practice
of medicine should sometimes trump the pursuit of profit.
In this context I will begin in Chapter 2 by defending and utilizing Barbara
Herman’s distinct interpretation of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative
(CI) combined with Denis Arnold and Norman Bowie’s interpretation of respect for
persons. I will then utilize these two interpretations of the CI to develop four midrange
principles that can be utilized to determine the acceptability of current practices
surrounding DTP marketing. In Chapter 3 I will address concerns surrounding whether
the practice of DTP marketing is inherently deceptive and manipulative. In the end, I
conclude that the practices are in fact deceptive and manipulative. Even more, such
practices clearly threaten patient care and the patient physician relationship, violating the
5

demands of respect for both patients and physicians. Next, in Chapter 4 I will examine
the financial impact that DTP marketing has had on the health care industry. I conclude
by arguing that DTP marketing has unnecessarily driven up health care spending. As
such, DTP marketing both threatens the stability of the health care system and restricts
access to care and financially harms patients through increases in drug prices and
insurance premiums. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue for a voluntary ban by both the AMA
and PhARMA on all questionable marketing practices surrounding DTP marketing.
However, there is strong reason to doubt whether a voluntary ban by these organizations
will be sufficient. If voluntary bans are not effective at eliminating the unethical
practices then the federal government has a responsibility to institute legislation to
effectively halt these practices.

6

Chapter 2
Kantian Foundations

The pharmaceutical industry continues to come under sustained criticism for
many of its questionable practices. One of the most central concerns has been the
practices surrounding DTP marketing. While many have attempted to argue that the
practice is immoral and needs to be radically altered, if not completely banned, few have
grounded these objections in a broader ethical framework. At the same time, much work
has been done in contemporary Kantian philosophy which has immensely expanded the
scope and salience of Kant’s original work. It is my intention to utilize these new
approaches to Kant’s ethics to ground objections to the practices of DTP marketing.
However, before beginning it will be important to address several concerns. Most
notably I must explain how we may properly consider corporations as moral agents and
why I find it necessary to formulate original principles instead of utilizing the work
developed by Principlists such as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. Further, while I
argue that the position articulated by Beauchamp and Childress is unconvincing, I must
explain why I find Herman’s contemporary account of Kantian ethics a more promising
source for the derivation of the guiding principles that will be necessary for the
discussion that follows.

7

1. Corporations as Moral Entities:
Since it is highly contentious as to whether corporations can even be properly
considered moral entities, it will be important to say something on this topic before
beginning. In 1979 Peter French developed an account of the metaphysical status of
corporations in which he argued that corporations can be properly understood as moral
agents. 7 As Denis Arnold points out, French argues for three main conclusions. These
are, “[f]irst, corporations exhibit intentionality. Second, corporations are capable of
exhibiting rationality regarding their intentions. And, third, corporations are capable of
altering their intentions and patterns of behavior.” 8 However, in response to his critics
French later adopted Bratman’s planning theory of intentionality. 9
Under their conception of intentionality, the corporate internal decision structure
(CID) articulated by French can be seen as indicative of moral agency. The CID
structure, “includes hierarchical lines of organizational responsibility, rules of procedure,
and corporate policies.” 10 Within this context it is helpful to examine the example that
Arnold uses to illustrate how a common interest and the meshing of subplans may emerge
in the context of a corporation. Arnold asks us to imagine the implementation of a new
environmental management program. The implementation of the new program will
require the meshing of subplans between different departments and divisions within the
company. Within this, “Human Resources crafts disciplinary procedures for employees
who violate the environmental policy. Corporate communications ensures that all
7

French, Peter A., “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979):
207-15.
8
Arnold, Denis G. “Corporate Moral Agency,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30 (2006): 279-91, 280.
9
For a recent review of the literature on this issue see, Arnold, Denis G, “Corporate Moral Agency" in
Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society, ed. Robert W. Kolb, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2007.
10
Ibid, 288.
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employees are informed of the environmental policy, together with sanctions for
violation, and so on.” 11 Each department must be aware of how the subplans, with
regards to the running of their department, are to mesh with the shared intention of
implementing the new policy. So long as all members within the corporation are
sufficiently aware of the new policy and its implications on how their specific function
within the corporation is affected, then all members within the corporation effectively
share the intention of implementing the new policy. Thus, by sharing a common
intention and meshing their subplans to achieve this common goal, a corporation may be
properly understood as being an intentional entity and thus a moral agent. As such, the
work of French, Bratman, and Arnold gives strong reason to accept corporations as moral
agents. However, if one does not accept French’s theory of corporate agency, one need
only to replace the discussion of corporate moral responsibility with the moral
responsibility of managers. 12 I imagine few would argue that corporate managers are
persons and as such have moral obligations. Further, since the decisions and actions
managers undertake, qua managers, often dictate the policies of the corporation and their
effects on other moral agents, it makes sense to say that these managers have moral
obligations in the same sense that I argue that corporations themselves do. Therefore, it
should be unproblematic for those who do not accept the account developed above to
merely substitute the language of corporate moral responsibility with that of
responsibility of corporate managers.
11

Ibid, 289.
While this is an acceptable alternative, I find the utilization of corporate moral agency particularly
helpful in this discussion. The reason for this is the fact that the practices examined in this thesis seem to
be indicative of, not only a corporate culture, but of a culture that is industry wide culture. As such, these
problems are not limited to the individual actions and policies of a few managers but seem to be pervasive
throughout the pharmaceutical industry. Hence, it is beneficial to be able to speak of corporate
responsibility across the industry as opposed to the actions of individual managers.

12
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2. The Common Morality:
There should now be sufficient reason to believe that we may effectively speak of
corporations as moral agents, however, the question still remains as to why I should
bother constructing my own foundation and deriving original principles when so much
work has been undertaken in the development of principles, in particular the work done
by Beauchamp and Childress. 13 The answer lies in the popularity of the
“common morality” as the foundation for the derivation of principles. In recent years the
common morality has rapidly gained prominence as several authors have used it as the
basis from which their ethical theories may be constructed. Most notable has been the
enthusiastic acceptance of the common morality as the starting point for the derivation of
their principles by Beauchamp and Childress in the 5th edition of Principles of
Biomedical Ethics 14 and its central role in the construction of their “descriptivist” ethical
theory by Gert, Culver, and Clouser in Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. 15
Supporters of the common morality maintain that,
[A]ll humans – at least all morally serious humans – have a pretheoretical
awareness of certain moral norms. The claim is that normal humans intuit or in
some other way know that there is something wrong with things like lying or
breaking promises or killing people. These purportedly universal shared insights
can provide the raw data from which ethical theories can be constructed.” 16

13

Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2nd -5th eds., New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001.
14
Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
15
Gert, Bernard, Charles M. Culver, and Danner K. Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
16
Veatch, Robert M., “Is There a Common Morality?,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 13, no. 3
(2003): 189-192.
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When one considers that one of the central problems within ethics, and in particular
applied ethics, has been how to construct an ethical theory that has universal normative
weight, it is easy to see why the common morality has been so attractive. As ethical
theory has traditionally developed, theories inevitably carry substantive, normative or
metaphysical presuppositions with them. As a result, one needs only to maintain that
they do not accept those presuppositions in order to reject the foundations that the theory
stands on. When those foundations are rejected, the ethical theory no longer carries any
normative weight for those who do not accept the presuppositions the theory is derived
from. Therefore, it is often difficult to develop an ethical theory that is universally
applicable. In response to these deep seated problems, the prospect of deriving an ethical
theory from supposedly universal empirical claims about the ethical nature of humans has
been extremely enticing.
The viability of the common morality view lies in the empirical claim that certain
general intuitions are universal to all morally serious humans. However, there is strong
reason to be skeptical about the universal nature of the common morality. Leigh Turner
has argued that, “proponents of a common morality approach to moral reasoning have not
made a persuasive argument in support of the claim that there are cross-cultural moral
norms supporting a “universal” common morality.” 17 He argues that such empirical
claims are in fact testable and that until a sufficient body of evidence exists to support
such empirical claims the common morality should be questioned. In a reply to several
critics, including Turner, Tom Beauchamp recognizes that the empirical claims that form

17

Turner, Leigh, “Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the ‘Common Morality’
Presumption in Bioethics,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 3 (2003): 193-218, 196.
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the foundation of the common morality need to be examined. 18 Even more, Robert
Veatch notes that a group of scholars at the Kennedy Institute along with others around
the world have committed themselves to the exploration of the common morality,
including the empirical studies that Turner calls for. 19
However, such studies may present a daunting task and are far from
uncontroversial. Beauchamp himself recognizes a central problem involved in testing the
empirical claims of the common morality. These problems center around the requirement
that all “morally serious” persons would universally agree on the common morality.
Defenders of the common morality readily acknowledge that there will be amoral or
immoral individuals who do not take morality seriously. Their claim is that all people
who do take morality seriously will share basic common moral intuitions. The problem
is that, “the question could be begged either by (1) designing the study so that the only
persons tested are precisely those who already have the commitments and beliefs the
investigator is testing for or (2) designing the study so that all persons are tested
regardless of whether they are committed to the objectives of morality.”20 Regardless, as
far as the common morality relies on universal empirical claims, the burden of proof is on
the defenders of the common morality to provide solid grounds for those claims.
However, problems surrounding the common morality go deeper than merely the
lack of studies that support the empirical claims. Jeffrey Brand-Ballard has argued that
the differences between the two primary camps who rely on the common morality, the
“principlists” such as Beauchamp and Childress and the “descriptivists” such as Gert,
18

Beauchamp, Tom L, “A Defense of the Common Morality,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no.
3, (2003): 259-74.
19
Veatch.
20
Beauchamp (2003), 263.
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Culver, and Clouser, lies in a deep seated inconsistency in the common morality. 21
Brand-Ballard argues that the division between the two approaches lies in their
understanding of how precisely they should utilize reflective equilibrium (RE) or wide
reflective equilibrium (WRE) to bring individual considered moral judgments (CMJ’s)
into line with the broader principles of principlism or the single moral system of
descriptivism. Brand-Ballard contends that both camps should see themselves as
differing approaches to the same problem of bringing CMJ’s into alignment with the
more general norms derived from the common morality.
Brand-Ballard’s criticism of the two approaches to the common morality does not
necessarily undermine the ability of the common morality to function as the starting point
for the derivation of an ethical theory. However, his criticism does pick out a serious
concern about ethical theories that rely on the common morality. This concern centers on
the fact that even if there is a universal common morality, we have not yet been able to
parse out how norms derived from the common morality should relate to the CMJ’s of
moral agents. There is significant disagreement as to where the epistemic weight lies in
ethical theories that rely on the common morality. If the epistemic weight lies in the
norms derived from the common morality, then the CMJ’s should be brought into line
with the more general norms. In fact, this is how Brand-Ballard characterizes what goes
on in descriptivist theories. On the other hand, if there is significant epistemic weight
given to individual CMJ’s, then the norms derived from the common morality should, at
least to some degree, be brought into congruence with the CMJ’s in reflective
equilibrium, as Beauchamp and Childress argue for. Thus, if Brand-Ballard is correct,
21

Brand-Ballard, Jeffrey, “Consistency, Common Morality, and Reflective Equilibrium,” Kennedy Institute
of Ethics Journal 13, no. 3 (2003): 231-58.
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then it is not clear how exactly we are to proceed from the empirical fact of a common
morality to an ethical theory based upon it. This very concern seems to have been
present when Beauchamp recognizes that, “a full defense of this view would require a
justification of all of the elements of my account, in particular, the object of morality,
considered judgments, the role of coherence, pragmatic justification, and specification.” 22
Thus, an examination of ethical theories based on the common morality serves to
illustrate just how early in development such accounts are. As such, there is reason for
healthy skepticism about the ability of the common morality to fare any better than earlier
attempts at a universal ethical theory. These concerns combined with the great strides
that have been made in contemporary Kantian ethics, which I will take up in the next
section, give sufficient reason for me to examine the potential for these new approaches
to provide a foundation for the derivation of principles that may serve to guide us through
an analysis of the practices of DTP marketing in the following chapters. 23

3. The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative:
A great deal of work has been undertaken in recent history in an attempt to
resurrect Kant’s ethics. The work of Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, Thomas Hill
Jr., Barbara Herman, and many others has served to develop a new understanding of
Kant’s ethics that, not only answers many of the common criticisms that have been
leveled against it, but creates an ethical theory that has strong potential to serve as a
22

Beauchamp (2003), 264.
A meta-ethical discussion of the debate surrounding differing approaches to the formulation of ethical
theories would be a thesis in itself. Suffice it to say that there are significant concerns surrounding the
enthusiastic acceptance of the common morality. These concerns combined with the relatively unnoticed
advances made in the development of Kant’s ethics provides strong reasons for the belief that such an
approach may provide better grounds for the derivation of guiding principles than the work by Beauchamp
and Childress based on the common morality.
23
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valuable guide to issues of contemporary applied ethics. In this vein, Barbara Herman
has attempted to develop a conception of the categorical imperative (CI) that may serve
as a guide to moral deliberation and action. However, any attempt to reformulate a
conception of Kant’s ethics must contend with a host of criticisms that have been leveled
against his theories. Therefore, as I discuss Herman I will demonstrate how her account
may serve to avoid most of the criticisms that have been directed at Kant’s ethics.
Probably the most well known and widely discussed aspect of Kant’s ethics
comes from his first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (CI), the Formula of
Universal Law. In articulating the first formulation, Kant states that we must, “Act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.” 24 Thus, the CI sets up a procedure as a limiting function by which
maxims may be tested. Through the CI procedure we are to test the maxims of an action
by inquiring as to whether that action could be willed as a universal law. Unacceptable
maxims will result in a contradiction and are thus ruled out.
Yet, much of the criticism by both proponents of and opponents to Kant’s ethics
have concentrated on how exactly the CI procedure is to be deployed and what precisely
we are to gather from its use. Commentators have attributed two primary roles to the CI.
Barbara Herman labels the first of these the derivation-of-duties model, whereby the CI
procedure is deployed in order to develop a list of duties and obligations. Much of the
criticism of this approach centers on the fact that it creates a rigid system of law-like
rules. As Herman notes, “such a theory is rightly charged with insensitivity to moral
complexity and righteous absurdity in requiring . . . that we keep all promises, tell no lies,
24

Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Arnulf Zweig, trans. (Oxford: Oxford
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regardless of the consequences.” 25 Thus, by using the CI in this manner, we derive a list
of absolute duties that must be followed under all circumstances. The problem with this
approach, and the reason why it doesn’t sit well with so many commentators, is that we
all know that the details of certain cases often make a very big difference. Yet, a rigorist
set of absolute laws cannot allow for consideration of such details.
The second approach, which has emerged out of more recent endeavors to apply
Kant’s theories, has been an attempt to use the CI as an algorithm into which we can plug
in a specific maxim, taking into account the details of a particular case, and the
universalization test will tell us whether that specific action is permissible. Many have
applauded this more recent approach because of its ability to side step the standard
objections leveled against the derivation-of-duties model. When the CI is utilized as an
algorithm and all pertinent details of the case are included in the maxim, the CI is then
able to take into consideration the salient details of the case.
However, there is still a deficiency in the use of the CI as an algorithm for
judgment. Herman’s lengthy discussion of differing approaches to using the CI in this
manner serves to illustrate the problems inherent in it. 26 Depending on the interpretation
used, there are problems of false positives and negatives and the flaw that virtually any
maxim can be made to pass or fail depending on how it is worded and which features are
included or omitted. 27 These problems leave this approach open to the charge of
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An example of such a problem would lie in the descriptive detail involved in a case of breaking a
promise. At a highly general level, a maxim of “breaking promises for any reason” would be easily ruled
out by the CI through the prevalently discussed result that such a maxim, when universalized, would lead to
a world in which promise making would not exist. Since all who make promises would be expected to
break them, the practice of promise making would cease to exist since the necessary trust required for the
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arbitrariness and greatly undermines the ability of the CI to be a guide to moral judgment.
As Herman notes, “difficulties with settling maxim content then undermine the adequacy
of the method of judgment.” 28
Adding to the problems inherent in the question of maxim specification and the
opposing approaches to the use of the CI is the problem of what precisely a contradiction
in the CI is supposed to entail. In response to such concerns Christine Korsgaard defines
three possible interpretations of contradiction in the CI, the logical, practical, and
teleological. 29 Both Korsgaard and Herman dismiss the teleological interpretation as
ineffective, however, they disagree over whether the logical or practical interpretations
should prevail. 30 Under the practical interpretation, “your action would become
ineffectual for the achievement of your purpose if everyone (tried to) use it for that
purpose.” 31 As such, you reach a contradiction when, by universalizing the maxim, you
effectively frustrate the goal you set for yourself. 32 On the logical interpretation, “there

practice would be destroyed. However, if we specify the maxim to a level of “breaking a promise when
physical conditions prevent one from keeping the promise,” we can begin to see how this more specific
maxim may pass where the other fails. Since it will be understood that there was every intention of
keeping the promise but factors outside of the control of the individual were responsible for the breaking of
the promise, then, when universalized, such a maxim does not result in the destruction of trust and the
expectation of the promise being kept as the other maxim does. Therefore, we may see how an action that
most would consider unproblematic becomes problematic if it is not described properly.
28
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Korsgaard defines the teleological contradiction, saying, “it would be contradictory to will your maxim
as a law for a system of nature teleologically conceived: either you are acting against some natural purpose,
or your maxim could not be a teleological law. The maxim is inconsistent with a systematic harmony of
purposes” (Ibid, 78). Korsgaard rejects this interpretation since it requires the acceptance of teleological
purposes that an agent may herself reject. Thus, “unless we can show that the agent is committed to the
purpose, it is possible to say that the system can do without the teleological arrangement because it can do
without the purpose” (Ibid, 92). Since Herman does not even note the teleological interpretation as a
contender, it seems safe to assume that she finds Korsgaard’s criticism decisive.
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As an example we can again look to the practice of promise making. If one were to universalize the
maxim of making promises you intend to break then no one would have the trust required to have faith in
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is something like a logical impossibility in the universalization of the maxim . . . if the
maxim were universalized, the action or policy that it proposes would be
inconceivable.” 33 Under this interpretation, universalization of the maxim does not
merely frustrate an individual’s goal but leads to a logical absurdity. 34
Korsgaard argues that the practical interpretation is preferable through a
discussion of what she calls “natural actions.” 35 It is the tendency of the logical
interpretation to produce false positives in not picking out clearly immoral acts as a
contradiction that leads Korsgaard to conclude that the practical interpretation must be
the correct one. Herman responds by pointing out that the practical interpretation is
guilty of creating false negatives in the case of so called “coordination activities.” 36
However, despite Herman’s objection to the practical interpretation, properly understood
her objections are misplaced. The problem lies in the formation of the maxims she

your promise. Therefore, you have created a situation where practically you cannot achieve your goal of
making a promise you intend to break since no one will trust you to keep your promise in the first place.
33
Ibid, 78.
34
Yet again we can examine the practice of promise keeping. If one were to universalize the maxim of
making promises with the intention of breaking them then there could be no conception of promise making
to begin with. We lose the possibility of promising even existing as a practice, and are left with a logical
absurdity.
35
Natural actions are those such as killing or harming another. Korsgaard introduces an example of
employing a maxim of “killing in order to secure a job.” Under the logical interpretation there is nothing
about universalizing such a maxim that would result in the logical impossibility of killing to secure a job.
However, from the standpoint of the practical interpretation such a contradiction can be discerned. If one
universalizes a maxim of killing in order to secure a job then we can see how practically such a
universalized practice would likely serve to thwart our goal of securing the job. Properly universalized we
would no sooner acquire the position than have the next person kill us for the same purpose. Ibid, 98.
36
Herman uses two examples to illustrate this problem. One is a maxim of “shopping after-Christmas sales
to buy the next year’s presents,” and the other is “playing tennis at 10:00 on Sunday” since the courts will
be empty because of church. Herman argues that there is no logical contradiction in the universalization of
these maxims despite the fact that they may not be very effective or prudent. However, under the practical
interpretation, universalizing that all should shop the after-Christmas sales for the next year’s presents will
result in after-Christmas sales being abandoned since there will be such high demand. In the case of the
tennis courts, by universalizing a maxim of playing tennis at 10:00 on Sunday the courts will be most
crowded instead of empty. Thus, under the practical interpretation the individual’s goals will have been
frustrated by the universalizing of the maxim. Yet there seems to be nothing morally wrong with such
coordination activities and it is not clear why they should be rejected by the CI. Herman, 138.
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wishes to test. It is only by specifying a certain time for the activity that she achieves the
problematic results she relies on. 37 Thus, due to the strengths of Korsgaard’s defense of
the practical interpretation and the weakness of the objections raised by Herman in favor
of the logical interpretation, I will rely on the practical interpretation for the purposes of
this discussion.
Yet, even if we have resolved the problems surrounding the competing
interpretations of contradiction in the CI, we have still not adequately addressed the
problems of maxim formation noted earlier. The derivation-of-duties model is too rigid a
system and its inattention to the particulars of a case make it insufficient as a guide to
moral deliberation. However, attempts to use the CI as an algorithm are equally
problematic since there is no clear way for properly formulating a maxim that avoids the
charge of arbitrariness. It is also important to note that while utilizing the CI as an
algorithm addresses the objections raised against the derivation-of-duties model as being
inattentive to the details of a case, such a procedure still yields absolute rules, the only
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There are reasons to object to how Herman formulates the maxims beyond concerns that she has not
properly captured the maxim in question. Joshua Glasgow argues that universalizing requires something
more than merely proposing the maxim for all possible people. He argues that maxims must be
universalized not merely across all persons but temporally as well. Glasgow develops this approach in
response to concerns and criticism surrounding certain imperfect duties such as the development of our
talents. He argues that by viewing universalization temporally that when we universalize a maxim of
necessarily developing our talents to achieve certain ends, this means that we must be capable of invoking
such a maxim at all times. This does not mean that we must at all times work to achieve that maxim but
that we may not attempt to instantiate a maxim that will subvert it. Thus, a maxim that says that we will
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need to develop certain talents to achieve certain ends. Under the understanding that maxims must be
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difference being they are more specific to the case. As a result, it may still be difficult to
develop maxims that will address the problem of competing obligations. 38
It is the problems of maxim formation that leads Herman to look at the CI
procedure from the perspective of maxims. Herman adopts a procedure where the CI is
used as a heuristic for moral deliberation and departs from both of the earlier attempts to
use the CI in decision making procedures. Instead she utilizes the CI as a procedure for
developing general guiding principles. 39 While this approach closely maps the
derivation-of-duties model, what we derive are merely guiding principles that operate as
a limiting function on human action, not absolute rules. This means that Herman’s
approach may effectively answer the objections leveled against the derivation of duties
model due to its rigid, absolute structure. The CI is utilized to test sufficiently general
maxims. Those that are rejected provide us with conditions where we should limit our
possible choices of action. However, as guiding principles instead of absolute rules they
may be overruled through the process of moral deliberation. As Herman notes, “the
characteristic moments of moral deliberation will occur when an agent perceives her
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To illustrate the problems inherent to using the CI to create rules that determine how to handle a case,
consider an example of coming across a drowning child while on the way to a promised meeting. In this
specific case, if one stops to help save the child then one will fail to fulfill the promise to meet a friend.
Under the derivation of duties model one will be presented with two competing duties. One must keep
one’s promise to a friend and yet one has a duty to aid someone in distress, at least when it carries little or
no risk or loss to oneself. Under the rigorist derivation-of-duties model there is no clear way to proceed.
Are we to say that one duty should always trump the other? That seems to be problematic because it is
easy to find counterexamples where the duty to keep one’s promise should win out (say the distress is
relatively minor). Are we to attempt to specify the case to derive a particular maxim that will allow us to
break our promise such as, “keep your promises unless you happen upon an individual in need?” Again the
problems of specification of the maxim quickly come to light. It is also unclear in either case what one
should do with the duty that is not fulfilled. Do we merely discard the duty to keep one’s promise to a
friend since another duty has overridden it? Neither approach seems to give us much direction in this
scenario.
39
I depart slightly from Herman’s discussion here by utilizing the practical interpretation of contradiction
in the CI instead of the logical interpretation she utilizes. However, this is a slight modification of her
approach and merely refines what it means for us to reach a contradiction.
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circumstances as exceptional or as containing conflicting moral considerations or
directives.” 40 Thus, the CI can be used to create a list of general principles serving a
limiting function. However, it is when we believe that the specifics of a case may make a
morally important difference that we enter into moral deliberation. As such, “the burden
of proof is on the agent to show that her circumstances deviate in a morally significant
way from those specified by the principle.” 41 When we are faced with a situation that
seems to depart from the general principle, we must discern what features of the case
make it distinct in some morally salient way. 42 We may then use those identified reasons
to engage in moral deliberation over the case and ask ourselves whether that case
significantly differs from what was identified as morally problematic in the general
principle.
It is important to notice that Herman’s account of the CI acts as a limiting
function on action, not as a required test for each action as some more demanding
interpretations of the CI as an algorithm seem to require. It is the fact that many
interpretations of the CI procedure as an algorithm seem to require us to present every
maxim for potential action to the procedure before acting that has led many to criticize
40
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Let us return to the example above of competing duties of keeping a promise and saving a drowning
child in order to see the advantages of Herman’s method. While we may begin with general guiding
principles of “keep one’s promises” and “aid those in distress when it presents little risk or loss to oneself,”
these are not absolute rules that we must follow. Under Herman’s approach we may see that the specifics
of the situation raise morally salient reasons that may undermine the requirements to keep your promise.
As such, it is easy to recognize that this is a situation where moral deliberation is necessary. One may then
step back and realize that the need to save the drowning individual overrides the limiting function of the
principle “keep one’s promises.” However, it is not the case that the duty to aid an individual under duress
will always trump the principle to keep one’s promises. Thus, it is as a limiting function that the principle
operates, forcing us to articulate morally significant reasons for our violation of the limiting function of the
general principle derived from the CI. Yet, we must still deliberate over the unfulfilled obligation. By
breaking our promise to a friend we may derive additional duties of apology and restitution. Therefore, we
must go back and reassess our obligations to keep a promise and under light of the new circumstances
determine how best to fulfill that duty.
41
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the approach as excessively demanding. However, because Herman utilizes the CI
procedure as a method for developing general guiding principles she creates a moral free
space in which we may operate without having to run every maxim for action through the
procedure. It is only when we encounter a maxim that comes into conflict with our
general guiding maxims that we must test the specific maxim. However, even if the
maxim fails, there may still be morally salient reasons for accepting the maxim, in which
case we must engage in moral deliberation. Hence, Herman’s approach answers the
problems of other approaches to the CI being too demanding or unacceptably rigid.
Instead, the principles that are derived from the CI help us to identify circumstances
where actions may be required or prohibited. Thus, we are generally free to live our lives
without constantly having to engage in moral deliberation and incessantly submitting
every action to the CI procedure to determine its acceptableness.

4. Rules of Moral Salience and Respect for Persons:
While Herman’s interpretation of the proper use of the first formulation of the CI
solves many of the criticisms leveled against the derivation-of-duties model and the use
of the CI as an algorithm we have still not addressed the charge of arbitrariness in the
formulation of maxims. Herman’s requirement that maxims must be developed at a
sufficiently generic level helps to alleviate certain concerns, however, it is clear that we
need a more detailed understanding of how precisely maxims are to be formulated. In
order to address this concern Herman introduces a concept she calls “rules of moral
salience” (RMS).
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For Herman, “the function of the RMS is to guide the normal moral agent to the
perception and description of the morally relevant features of his circumstances of
action.” 43 Yet how are we to derive the RMS and if they are independent from the CI
procedure what justification do they have? Herman argues that we are to derive the RMS
from the “Moral Law” which requires us to respect the humanity of all persons. Herman
states that, “I think of the RMS as an interpretation, in rule form, of the respect for
persons (as ends-in-themselves) which is the object of the Moral Law.” 44 As such, the
RMS help to pick out the aspects of the case that are morally salient by forcing us to
consider the case from the perspective of respect for persons. Therefore, the RMS must
instruct us in three regards before we present a maxim to the universalization test. Those
are:
1) Who is a moral agent or end-in-himself? What are the marks that distinguish
ends-in-themselves from other entities?
2) What are the conditions of agency for ends-in-themselves? In what ways are
such agents vulnerable? Are agents self-sufficient or dependent on others
(and in what ways) for sustaining themselves as agents? What forms of action
interfere with the exercise of agency?
3) What are the marks of reasonable claims and restraints? 45
By helping us to identify these important features of the case we may avoid the charge of
arbitrariness. Maxims are to be articulated in such a manner that they take note of such
morally salient features. As a result, RMS can be used both as a mechanism to limit what
maxims may be tested and to help us to identify situations and maxims that require
further moral deliberation. Maxims that are shown to not properly respect the humanity
of individuals need not be brought to the CI for consideration. However, at the same
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time, conditions that can be identified through the RMS as important because of
considerations of respect for persons must be brought to the CI procedure and
deliberated. 46
Yet, beyond this Herman has little to say about what exactly RMS are to be or
why respect for persons should operate in the manner it does concerning the development
of maxims. Thus, a discussion of the second formulation of the CI, “respect for
humanity” is necessary. 47 In my examination of Kant’s second formulation of the CI, I
will closely track the work of both Norman Bowie and Denis Arnold whose influential
analysis of this account has already helped to inform practices particular to certain areas
of business. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states, “act in such a
way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.” 48 This is Kant’s
second formulation of the CI, the formula of humanity. As Arnold and Bowie point out,
“Kant’s defense of respect for persons is grounded in the uncontroversial claim that
humans are capable of rational, self-governing activity.” 49 However, we must first
determine why we are to never treat humanity merely as a means but always as an end.
What is it about humanity that prevents us from using it as a mere means? As rational
46

Herman herself does not go into detail as to how exactly the RMS are to be used in conjunction with her
distinct interpretation of the CI procedure. I have done my best to articulate how the two concepts are to
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interpretation of how we are to unite the two approaches.
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individuals who are capable of setting and pursuing our own individual ends we are
accorded dignity and for Kant dignity is priceless, meaning that nothing may outweigh or
eclipse the dignity we are accorded as free and rational individuals.
Morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in
himself because only through it is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the
realm of ends. Thus morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality,
alone have dignity. 50
Thus, humanity must be respected because freedom to rationally set and pursue
our moral ends is what gives us dignity and that dignity is beyond price. However, we
still have not determined what it means to respect the humanity in persons. First, we
must recognize that, to the degree that we acknowledge and respect the humanity in
ourselves, we must do the same in all persons. To not do so would be inconsistent in our
treatment of humanity. So we must respect the humanity in others by never using them
merely as a means but always as an ends. 51 Yet how are we to understand what it is to
respect the humanity in others? Arnold and Bowie rely heavily on the analysis of respect
for persons provided by Thomas Hill Jr. According to Hill, respect for persons has two
distinct requirements. First, we must never merely use a person as a means. This entails
a negative duty to not violate the freedom of individuals and their ability to set and
pursue their own ends. As a result, we may not engage in deceptive, manipulative, or
coercive behavior since this necessarily undermines the ability of persons to make
rational choices and to set and pursue their own ends. Engaging in such behavior
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undermines an agent’s rational pursuit of her ends in favor of the pursuit of our own. It is
an imposing of our own will on another. 52
Secondly, we must treat humanity as an end. This is a positive obligation that
goes beyond merely non-interference in the rational pursuit of another’s ends. Bowie and
Arnold characterize these positive obligations articulated by Hill as follows, “treating
persons as ends-in-themselves requires supporting and developing certain human
capacities, including the capacity to act on reason; the capacity to accept categorical
imperatives; and the capacity to understand the world and reason abstractly.” 53 Bowie
adds to these positive obligations the obligations not to be indifferent to others and to be
concerned with the physical welfare and moral wellbeing of others. 54 Therefore, through
a more thorough understanding of what respect for persons entails it will now be easier to
develop RMS that may inform our deliberation concerning the practices of DTP
marketing.

5. Midrange Principles:
With a discussion of how we are to use the first and second formulations of the CI
in hand, we are now left to develop a set of principles that can later be applied to the
practices of DTP marketing. However, some may wonder how such principles are
distinct from the RMS discussed above. As I read Herman, RMS are used as both a
limiting function for the application of maxims to the CI procedure and as a mechanism
to pick out the morally salient features of a case. RMS operate as a limiting function by
52
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recognizing cases where persons are not properly respected. In these cases an individual
may recognize that a maxim may be ruled out before it is even taken to the
universalization procedure since it shows an inherent lack of respect for the persons
involved in the action; namely, cases where individuals are used as means and not as
ends-in-themselves. RMS can also be used to pick out the elements of a maxim that are
important and must be included in its articulation. Thus, the manner in which a maxim
involves another individual and their rational capacities must be a central component in
the description of the maxim. While RMS may certainly serve a limiting function similar
to that of a principle, they are not a guide to action. On the other hand, principles can be
used to pick out duties and responsibilities required in certain situations, as well as serve
as a limiting function on possible actions. Thus, principles provide a much richer and
more robust guide to action than RMS.
I will develop four guiding principles in this section through appeals to both the
theories of respect for persons discussed above and through the application of maxims to
the universalization test of the CI procedure. I will begin by stating the principle to be
derived and then follow with and explanation for and defense of the principle.

5.1. Pharmaceutical companies are obligated to be trustworthy in their marketing
practices.
Trust is a central and founding element of all business practice. In fact, many have
claimed that without trust business could not exist. 55 There are two primary mechanisms
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If I could not trust you to provide me with the product or service promised why would I ever give you the
money demanded for such a product or service? Similarly, if businesses cannot expect payment for the
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through which trust in a business context may be eroded that I will concentrate on here.
Those are manipulation and deception. However, before we begin, it is vital to clearly
articulate working definitions of manipulation and deception. In this regard I will rely on
the account of manipulation developed by Michael Kligman and Charles M. Culver.
Kligman and Culver argue that:
The attempt to influence B’s behavior takes on a manipulative character when the
communicative stance or approach taken by A towards B loses this
straightforward and open quality. A’s primary intent is no longer to convince B,
in a good faith manner, that acting as desired by A would be in keeping with B’s
rational assessments of outcome; it is now to procure or engineer the needed
assent by bringing pressure to bear, in a deliberate and calculated way, on what he
presumes to be the manipulable features of B’s motivational system. 56
However, there are many ways in which manipulation, so described, may be
achieved. One strategy for manipulating an individual may play on characteristics of the
individual’s personality or certain psychological predispositions an individual or people
in general may possess. Kligman and Culver term this “manipulation of personality
traits” and go on to explain that:
One can play on others’ insecurity, gullibility, or fear, pander to their vanity,
morbid curiosity, or superstitiousness, exploit their sentimentality, misplaced
anger, or wishful thinking. One need not rely on character flaws or weaknesses
alone to gain leverage over another. One can also appeal to the sense of duty,
sympathy, friendship, or generosity in others, or utilize the rule-abidingness,
industry, honesty, or cooperativity of one’s fellows to advantage. In either case, it
is the premeditated exploitation of some systematic character trait to achieve an
ulterior purpose which stamps the behavior as manipulative.
As a specific form of manipulation, deception is another mechanism by which one
may endeavor to manipulate others. While Kligman and Culver do not explicitly provide

products or services provided why would they ever provide them in the first place? Thus, all business
transactions rely on some minimal level of trust.
56
Kligman, Michael and Charles M. Culver, “Interpersonal Manipulation,” Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy, 17, (1992): 173-197, 186-7.

28

an account of deception, there are two distinct methods of manipulation that they
illustrate which I believe fall under this heading. First is their discussion of “deceptive
communicative intent.” They describe the practices as instances where:
There is a difference between the actual communicative intent (A actually
engages B because he needs action X from B in order to bring about O) and the
projective communicative intent (A strives to create the false impression that he is
engaging B in the interaction for other, more innocent reasons, in an effort to
conceal his ulterior motives from B). 57
The other mechanism discussed that falls under the heading of deception comes in
their discussion of an imbalance of knowledge or information. Kligman and Culver cite
Sociologist Peter Abell here, who claims that:
If, in the process of changing B’s preferences, A intentionally or otherwise
controls B’s access to relevant information, such that he either (a) reduces B’s
understanding of his situation (including implications of adopting one course of
action rather than another or, (b) reduces the perception of means open to him,
then A is manipulating B. 58
Kligman and Culver go on to add that, “a manipulator might deliberately withhold or
selectively present information, or exploit the ignorance of beliefs of his victim so as to
be able to maintain control over his perceived options and steer him in the desired
direction.” 59 What is common to both of these accounts of manipulation is that they both
rely on some form of misrepresentation of information. It is because of this common
element that I group the two together under the heading of deception.
Equipped with working definitions of manipulation and deception we may now
ask ourselves whether a maxim of “manipulating or deceiving individuals to increase
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sales” is acceptable. 60 We will begin by examining the maxim from the perspective of
respect for persons. To begin we must determine how exactly manipulation and
deception treat persons as means and not ends-in-themselves. A useful place to begin is
Sarah Buss’s essay, “Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons.” Buss questions the
link between autonomy and our moral obligations towards one another. 61 While I will
later argue against Buss’s thesis, her discussion of the link between autonomy and moral
obligations is useful in determining why manipulation and deception violate the second
formulation of the CI.
Buss begins by accepting the Kantian claim that autonomy is intrinsically
valuable. However, “the premise that autonomy is intrinsically valuable seems to imply
nothing about the value of those who have and exercise this capacity except that they are
themselves valuable insofar as they have and exercise it. In particular, it does not seem to
imply that we fail to do justice to their value when we value them solely in their capacity
as autonomous agents.” 62 The problem lies in the relationship between autonomy and
manipulation and deception. While manipulation and deception certainly influence an
agent and limit autonomy, they do not fully prevent an agent from exercising their
rational capacities or forming their own reasons for action. In fact this is what
differentiates a manipulated or deceived agent from one who is compelled. So what is
60

There is a great deal of debate in the literature over what precisely manipulation and deception entail.
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objectionable about manipulation and deception cannot be that they prevent an agent
from forming their own reasons for action.
Another possible answer comes from Herman. Herman claims that what is wrong
with manipulation and deception is that the manipulator wishes to bring the agent under
their causal control. By attempting to bring the victim under the deceiver’s control the
deceiver prevents the victim from being the source of reasons “all the way down.” 63 In
essence, the reasons for action are ultimately the reasons of the deceiver, not the agent.
However, we may still ask what is meant by arguing that the agent must be the source of
reasons “all the way down.”
Buss astutely recognizes that this cannot mean that the agent acts without the
presence of nonrational influences. We are constantly influenced in countless ways by
nonrational or unconscious factors. Hence, such a requirement would mean that “true
rational agency is not a conceptual possibility – at least not for human beings.” 64 We are
also prevented from claiming that the problem lies in the fact that the victim does not
know of the intentions of the deceiver in their attempt to come to a rational decision since
we are rarely aware (at least fully aware) of the intentions of others. Since we still
consider ourselves as the author of our reasons despite this lack of knowledge, this is not
an acceptable explanation either. 65
So what are we to say? Despite the fact that Buss rejects it as an acceptable
explanation, I believe the answer lies in the next explanation she considers. This
explanation is that “deceit and manipulation are (usually) morally wrong because the
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deceiver/manipulator treats his victim’s reason, her capacity to govern herself, as a mere
means.” 66 Hence, by utilizing nonrational influences or altering/limiting access to
information, a manipulator creates conditions where the victim is likely, through their
own rational capacities and reasons, to come to a decision or action that corresponds to
the desires of the manipulator. Hence, the manipulator does not treat the capacity of the
victim to form their own reasons as an ends-in-itself but instead utilizes those capacities
to encourage the victim to make a judgment that the manipulator desires.
However, Buss wishes to dismiss this explanation on the grounds that if this were
truly the goal of the manipulator then “it must be that he would be willing to reduce her to
an instrument if this were possible.” 67 In essence, if the goal of the manipulator is to
utilize the autonomy of the agent as an instrument then there should be no moral
distinction for the manipulator between merely manipulating or deceiving and completely
undermining the autonomy of the agent. Yet, “those who intentionally mislead or
manipulate another person would not, as a general rule, be willing to treat this person as a
mere instrument, even if they could do so for only a limited time and with respect to a
very limited range of choices.” 68 Since few who manipulate and deceive are willing to
completely deny an agent of their autonomy then this means that the problem with
manipulation and deception cannot be that they wish to treat the agent as a mere
instrument.
However, I find Buss’s objection unconvincing. Buss wishes to conflate the
desire to utilize another agent’s rational capacities for our own ends with the desire to
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completely undermine their rational capacities and argues that since many who
manipulate and deceive would be unwilling to do so this undermines the argument. Yet,
should we accept this conclusion? The morally important distinction between acts of
deception and manipulation and those where one completely usurps an agent’s autonomy
lies in a matter of degree. If autonomy is intrinsically valuable, as Buss is willing to
concede, then there is a moral distinction between manipulation/deception and the
complete usurpation of an agent’s rational capacities. In cases of manipulation and
deception the agent still maintains a level of control and power; hence the agent still
possesses their intrinsically valuable autonomy, albeit at a rather limited level. The
conclusion being that since manipulation and deception do less damage to autonomy than
cases where one completely undermines an agent’s autonomy, these acts are less
objectionable. This is the reason that many who manipulate and deceive would be
unwilling to completely undermine that agent’s autonomy.
This distinction may also help us to work through what many may consider the
overly inclusive definitions of manipulation and deception discussed above. It may be
correctly remarked that such definitions will proscribe nearly all forms of marketing and
even many of our normal interactions. However, by recognizing the moral significance
of degrees by which one’s rational agency may be undermined by such activities we may
begin to see a moral distinction between many of these acts. We may grant that nearly all
forms of persuasive marketing and many normal interactions are manipulative and
deceptive; however, some are much more morally worrisome than others. This may
mean that we have reason to wish to be more open and straightforward in all of our
marketing and interactions with each other while still recognizing that there are certain
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actions that are only minimally morally objectionable, while others that undermine our
capacity to act for our own reasons to greater degrees are much more problematic. 69
Therefore, it is largely the degree to which such actions are likely to successfully
weaken an agent’s ability to act for their own reasons that is objectionable. This is likely
the underlying intuition that has guided much of the discussion of marketing and sales
practices in business. It is common to place the requirements of honesty and
transparency in these practices on a sliding scale based on the level of knowledge
disparity between the marketer/seller and the consumer. As the disparity grows
increasingly larger, the ability of the agent to maintain their own rational agency in the
face of manipulative or deceptive information diminishes. Hence, manipulative and
deceptive marketing becomes more morally problematic as the level of rational agency
that may be retained grows smaller and the scope of the influence becomes more
pervasive.
However, what is morally repugnant about manipulation and deception is that
victims are not treated as an ends-in-themselves. Instead, their autonomy and rational
agency is used as a means for the realization of the manipulator’s goals. The manipulator
does not treat the victim’s autonomy as an ends-in-itself but merely as a tool that they
may control through manipulation and deception for the attainment of their own ends.
Yet, the degree and success of such attempts is variable, and as such, some are more
objectionable than others. Therefore, according to the second formulation of the CI, a
69
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maxim of manipulating and deceiving to increase profits fails. Yet, we must ask upon
closer inspection just how objectionable the marketing techniques of pharmaceutical
companies are. If there is only a minor knowledge disparity and the rational agency of
physicians is only minimally threatened by these practices then there may be other
reasons in favor of DTP marketing that override the rather minor moral objections to the
practices. At that time we will be required to engage in moral deliberation to decide
whether the benefits offer morally salient reasons to depart from the principle outlined
above. However, if the knowledge disparity is great and the manipulation is shown to be
highly effective and thus the threat to the rational agency of physicians significant, then
there is strong reason to object to such practices on the grounds of respect for persons.
According to Herman’s account, the fact that the maxim fails to properly respect
the humanity of those being manipulated means that there is no need to progress further.
Since the RMS help to pick out maxims which fail to show proper respect for persons
there is no need to ask whether the maxim may pass the CI procedure. However, in the
interest of providing the strongest defense of the principles I deploy, I will go on to show
how such a maxim fails the universalization test as well. If one universalizes a maxim of
“manipulating individuals to increase sales” then everyone who markets and sells a
product will utilize manipulative and deceptive mechanisms to achieve their goal. While
deception and manipulation may still function when an individual is aware that they are
being manipulated and deceived, often the success of such endeavors depends on the fact
that the individual being manipulated does not realize it is occurring. In order for the
victim to not realize that they are being manipulated, a certain level of trust must be
present. In essence, the victim must believe they are not being manipulated. However,
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as far as individuals do in fact value their agency, there will be strong reasons for them to
attempt to combat or remove themselves from interactions that are manipulative or
deceptive. If this tendency holds true, and if everyone who markets or sells a product
engages in systematic manipulation and deception, then all will be on their guard against
such attempts.
It may be replied that virtually all forms of marketing and advertising are at least
minimally deceptive and often times manipulative. Yet, advertising still exists.
However, nearly all of us have come to realize that we must take the claims made in
advertising with a grain of salt. We do not reject marketing claims outright because we
recognize that there is often a degree of reliable or valuable information provided.
Hence, persuasive marketing seems to operate on two levels, by manipulating and
deceiving and by trying to rationally persuade us through reliable and accurate
information. However, if marketing was universally manipulative and deceptive and did
not have elements of rational persuasion we would likely reject such attempts outright.
Thus, our skeptical receptivity to advertising likely lies more in the fact that we recognize
some valuable characteristics to it rather than a claim that we would not reject such
efforts were they to be universally manipulative and deceptive.
However, this healthy skepticism points to the fact that the knowledge that
advertising is manipulative and deceptive means that such measures are not as effective
as they would have been had individuals thought the techniques were trustworthy.
Hence, the widespread recognition of these practices as manipulative or deceptive means
that the goal of increasing sales is frustrated at the practical level. These implications are
even more pronounced in the context of DTP marketing. The more technical a product
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is, and the more dangers associated with it, the more trust is needed to protect the
increasingly more vulnerable position of the consumer. Since the consumer has less
ability to confirm the claims made and protect themselves trust plays a more important
role as the product becomes more technical and this is especially problematic with
regards to pharmaceuticals. Even more, as will be illustrated later, such practices are
much more clearly manipulative and deceptive than those of general advertising. The
recognition of this characteristic of DTP marketing has led to many reactions that provide
empirical evidence for the claim that the universal employment of manipulation and
deception will serve to frustrate the goal of increasing sales. 70
Hence, with everyone aware of, and on guard against, manipulation the success of
these marketing techniques becomes greatly undermined. It is here that the distinction
between the practical and logical contradictions becomes vital. While universalizing
such practices will not make it logically impossible to sell products through manipulative
practices, 71 it is easy to see that, at the practical level, manipulation and deception will
frustrate the goal of increasing sales. A final objection may be raised that because
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pharmaceuticals are so necessary, manipulative and deceptive marketing techniques will
not be enough to prevent patients from purchasing and physicians from prescribing
medications. However, I am not claiming that the universal endorsement of such
practices will result in individuals not purchasing or prescribing medications. What I am
claiming is that such practices will not effectively achieve their goal of increasing sales.
So while many will still prescribe and purchase medications, sales will not have increased
through the manipulative and deceptive techniques employed. Regardless, business as
we know it operates largely due to a basic foundation of trust between the customer and
the seller, a foundation that becomes increasingly more important the more technical and
dangerous a product is due to the greater vulnerability entailed in such interactions. If
such a foundation of trust is destroyed through systematic manipulation and deception it
is difficult to imagine the system of business continuing to exist and function. Thus,
since a maxim of “manipulating individuals to increase sales,” fails the CI both at the
level of respect for persons and through the universalization test the importance and
central position of trust in these interactions is highlighted. Therefore we may derive the
principle: pharmaceutical companies are obligated to be trustworthy in their marketing
practices. 72

5.2. Physicians are obligated to be trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient care.
Since the practice of DTP marketing obviously involves physicians, it is crucial to be
clear on the obligations physicians have which may have a bearing on their interactions
with the pharmaceutical industry. So we may ask; if interactions with the pharmaceutical
72
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industry undermine a physician’s ability to make decisions in the best interests of their
patients, is this acceptable? Will a maxim of “physicians participating in interactions that
threaten their ability to make independent decisions in the interest of patient care” pass
the CI?
The practice of medicine is governed by a strong fiduciary duty. As originally
articulated as a concept of law, fiduciary responsibility is defined by stating that, “the
agreement to act on behalf of the principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary, that is, a
person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of
another in matters connected with his undertaking.” 73 When applied to the practice of
medicine, fiduciary responsibilities dictate that “the principal focus of medical practice
should be the patient’s interest. The physician’s conduct in the clinical realm should
consistently reflect this.” 74
Physicians have a well-established and long-standing ethic, which places patient
care as its primary responsibility. In their Code of Medical Ethics, the AMA
characterizes the patient physician relationship by stating that, “the relationship between
patient and physician is based on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to
place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest and above obligations to other
groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.” 75 This strong ethic is necessary
because of the generally vulnerable position of the patient.76 Patients seek the physician
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as expert and must trust that expert to offer the best treatment and care possible. Without
proper training, there is no way for the patient to know whether their physician is
providing the best treatment for them. Since the relationship between patient and
physician is clearly governed by duties of fiduciary responsibility, the patient is
warranted in assuming that the decisions made by their physician are made in their best
interests. 77 Thus, any decision that is influenced by considerations apart from patient
care is deceptive. Since the patient comes to the physician as expert with the goal that the
physician will make professional decisions in their best interests, a physician who fails to
do so fails to respect the ends patients have set for themselves in seeking medical care.
Physicians who make decisions based on considerations apart from patient care
misrepresent themselves to their patients, thus deceiving them. As shown above,
manipulative and deceptive actions show an inherent lack of respect for the humanity of
the victim. Hence, the practice of allowing considerations outside of the interests of the
patient should be rejected on the grounds that it does not respect the humanity of the
patient.
problematic disparity of power and information that permeates interactions in professions such as medicine
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It is also easy to see how such a maxim would fail when universalized. As noted
above, the strong fiduciary duty that governs the practice of medicine originates in the
knowledge disparity between physicians and patients. The fact that patients seek out
physicians predominantly lies in the fact that they can rely on the physician to utilize
their greater expertise to further their own purposes (in this case better health).
Therefore, such a relationship hinges on trust between patient and physician. However, if
all physicians were to allow factors outside of the best interests of the patient to govern
their decisions then the foundation of trust necessary for the practice of medicine would
greatly diminish. It is unlikely that patients would continue to subject themselves to the
whims of physicians who make decisions for reasons of personal gain or based on the
interests and influences of third parties. At the practical level the lack of trust would
make the process of providing care excessively cumbersome. Physicians must currently
explain treatments to patients and obtain informed consent, however, one can imagine
how difficult and time consuming this process would become if patients had very little
reason to trust the opinions and motives of their physicians. Again, it is the betrayal and
destruction of trust that is fundamental to the failure of the maxim. Therefore, it is trust
that must be protected and we may derive the principle, physicians are obligated to be
trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient care. 78

5.3. Pharmaceutical companies have a duty of nonmaleficence with regard to the
patients who utilize their products.
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The principle of nonmaleficence has been most clearly articulated by Tom Beauchamp
and James Childress in their seminal work, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. While I do
not find the common morality upon which Beauchamp and Childress build their
principles persuasive, their account of nonmaleficence does provide a good starting place
for an examination of negative duties that surround actions that may directly or indirectly
harm persons. Beauchamp and Childress define nonmaleficence by stating that, “the
principle of nonmaleficence asserts an obligation not to inflict harm on others,” and
define harm in the nonnormative sense of “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some
party’s interests.” 79
It is easy to see how such a principle is derived out of the examination of respect
for persons discussed above. Proper respect for the humanity of persons requires that we
respect them as ends-in-themselves. As such, a negative duty of noninterference can be
derived. It is quite clear that practices that prevent or undermine the ability of individuals
to set and pursue their own ends or interests are clear violations of the requirements laid
out under the formula of humanity. On a more specific level, we may see how certain
practices within the pharmaceutical industry may negatively infringe on the ability of
individuals to set and pursue their own ends by harming patients. This harm comes
primarily in two distinct forms. The first is direct harm to the health and wellbeing of
patients. A maxim of “increasing sales no matter the effects on patients” will fail because
often the pursuit of profit will come at the expense of patients. Such harm undermines
the pursuit of individuals’ ends. As far as the primary interest of patients is the optimal
treatment of their condition and the goal of overall health, such influences directly
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interfere with their pursuit of those interests and improperly respect their humanity.
The other manner in which interactions with the pharmaceutical industry may be
seen to harm patients is less directly, through financial harm. Many claim that marketing
of pharmaceuticals, and DTP marketing in particular, unnecessarily drive up health care
spending, which through higher pharmaceutical prices or higher insurance premiums,
have a negative financial impact on patients. Since money is necessary for the pursuit of
nearly all ends an agent may set, especially those vital to survival including food, shelter,
and health care, financially harming patients can be seen as frustrating or undermining
their ability to set and pursue their own ends. Thus, such financial harm directly conflicts
with the negative duties inherent to respect for persons. 80 Hence, maxims that harm
individuals are prohibited through the requirements of respect for persons. Since these
maxims are prohibited by the RMS through appeals to respect for persons we may derive
a negative duty of nonmaleficence. Therefore, pharmaceutical companies have a duty of
nonmaleficence with regard to the patients who utilize their products. 81

5.4. Pharmaceutical companies are obligated to not undermine the prudential
expenditure of limited health care resources.
As health care spending in the United States continues to outstrip the growth of the GDP,
the sustainability of the industry becomes increasingly threatened. Eventually
consumption of the GDP by health care spending will begin to threaten many essential
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elements of our federal government such as defense and maintenance of our national
infrastructure. Ultimately we will reach a point of critical mass in which the system will
become unsustainable and collapse. These are alarming and unfortunate realities that we
presently face. 82
Thus, under the realities of our current situation we may examine whether a
maxim of, “undermining the prudential expenditures of health care resources in the
pursuit of profit” may pass the CI. As each element of the health care industry engages in
practices that drive up health care spending without corresponding increases in benefits
then the current problem of unsustainable health care spending becomes dramatically
exacerbated. Since the system already teeters on the verge of collapse, the
universalization of such practices will very quickly lead to the destruction of the health
care industry. Unfortunately, in order for this result to actually occur we do not need to
imagine even the universal institution of such practices. All that needs to occur is that the
system continues at the pace already set and this outcome will be an inevitability. Thus,
there is an imperative for all elements of the industry to exercise prudence in the
spending that they encourage.
As discussed above, increases in health care spending financially harm patients.
If such increases in spending cannot be justified through benefits provided to patients by
the new drugs or therapies, then it may be claimed that this does financial harm to
patients and violates the obligation of nonmaleficence invoked above. 83 However, we
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may also evaluate the maxim in reference to the universalization test. I develop this
aspect of the issue separately from the discussion of nonmaleficence above because these
practices have implications on justice as well as harm to individuals. Since the health
care industry is so fragile, if the system collapses it will become difficult or even
impossible to find care. Since the consequences of decisions concerning health care
expenditures are not isolated to the individuals who make them, they inherently involve
issues of justice. 84 The destruction of the health care industry will not only harm those
who need care and will be denied it but will deny access to individuals who will need
care in the future. Since it is difficult to claim that these individuals will be harmed by
care that is not available it will be difficult to say that their interests should be respected
under the principle of nonmaleficence. However, these implications are issues of justice
since the unprudential expenditure of resources precludes the possibility of these
individuals obtaining care in the future. Hence the principle, pharmaceutical companies
are obligated to not undermine the prudential expenditure of limited health care
resources may be derived. 85

We have now developed four midrange principles that may offer guidance in the
analysis of the specific practices that surround DTP marketing. These principles are:
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1) Pharmaceutical companies are obligated to be trustworthy in their marketing
practices
2) Physicians are obligated to be trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient
care
3) Pharmaceutical companies have a duty of nonmaleficence with regard to the
patients who utilize their products
4) Pharmaceutical companies are obligated to not undermine the prudential
expenditure of limited health care resources
Any aspects of DTP marketing that can be shown to violate the principles articulated
above are susceptible to the charge that they are morally unacceptable. However, as
Herman’s account asserts, these principles are not absolute rules that cannot be
overridden. If there are morally salient reasons that may provide sufficient grounds for
the abandonment of these principles 86 then moral deliberation is required. Regardless,
we may now proceed to the analysis of the particular practices that comprise DTP
marketing and assess whether they may be defended on moral grounds.
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Chapter 3
Marketing and Prescribing

Concerns over whether the practices of DTP marketing properly respect the
humanity of those who are impacted generally center on two distinct groups. These are
the physicians who are targeted by DTP marketing and their patients. The impact of
these practices is especially worrisome because of the delicate nature of the patient
physician relationship and the incredible power and responsibility that physicians are
entrusted with. In this chapter I will examine the details of the practices of DTP
marketing in order to determine whether they involve deception and manipulation and
thus violate the first principle of, pharmaceutical companies are obligated to be
trustworthy in their marketing practices. I will then examine whether these interactions
interfere with physicians’ abilities to make proper prescribing decisions in the best
interests of their patients. If such interactions can be shown to negatively impact
prescribing decisions and compromise physicians’ abilities to make unbiased decisions in
the interests of their patients then physicians are in violation of the second principle,
physicians are obligated to be trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient care. As
such, physicians are rightly charged with being complicit in the ethically unacceptable
practices that make up DTP marketing. Finally, I will examine the impact that such
interactions have on patient care. I will argued that based on a substantial body of
empirical data, such practices do direct physical harm to patients through encouraging
improper prescribing. As a result, these practices violate the third principle of;
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pharmaceutical companies have a duty of nonmaleficence with regard to the patients who
utilize their products.

1. Marketing or Education:
We may begin by examining the practice of pharmaceutical sales representatives
(PSR’s) visiting physicians to market a specific product, commonly referred to as
“detailing.” The pharmaceutical industry defends the practice of detailing by claiming
that they provide valuable, unbiased information to physicians. In their “Code of
Interactions with Health care Professionals,” PhARMA 87 states that, “Informational
presentations and discussions by industry representatives and others speaking on behalf
of a company provide valuable scientific and educational benefits.” 88 They go on to
claim that, “Interactions should be focused on informing health care professionals about
products, providing scientific and educational information, and supporting medical
research and education.” 89 Every major American pharmaceutical company voluntarily
adopted PhARMA’s code of conduct as a guideline for interacting with physicians, thus
these companies have agreed that interactions should be governed by these
considerations.
Even more, several companies independently hold themselves to similar standards
regarding interactions with health care professionals. Merck states that, “Information
furnished to our customers about our products and services . . . must be useful, accurate,
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supported by scientific evidence where relevant, and presented honestly, fairly and by
proper means.” 90 Bristol-Myers Squibb affirms that, “Our advertising should always be
truthful, and specific claims must be fair and substantiated.” 91 While attempts by
companies such as Merck and Bristol-Myers Squibb to reaffirm their commitment to such
high standards are laudable, the fact that all of the major American pharmaceutical
companies adopted the guidelines set out by PhARMA means that they have all agreed to
hold themselves to these guiding principles.
Thus, it is clear that the industry wishes to portray interactions between PSR’s and
physicians as primarily an educative endeavor. Since the industry depicts the practice of
pharmaceutical detailing in this manner, physicians have reason to assume that the
information they receive from PSR’s is both accurate and unbiased. Therefore, if it can
be shown that the information provided by PSR’s is inaccurate and biased then the
practice of detailing is necessarily manipulative and deceptive. By portraying inaccurate,
biased information as reliable and balanced the industry undermines physicians’ abilities
to pursue their professional goal of making the best possible prescribing and treatment
decisions for their patients.
However, it is important to recognize that the pharmaceutical industry has not
unnecessarily adopted such high standards for itself. There are persuasive arguments that
support the need for information provided by industry representatives to be accurate and
unbiased. Despite the fact that physicians are highly educated, there is still a significant
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discrepancy in the knowledge that PSR’s have over physicians. New pharmaceuticals are
generally the most aggressively marketed. As such, the physician may have little or no
knowledge of the mechanics or characteristics of the new product. This raises concern
over whether the physician may have enough information to ask the right questions and
effectively fill in the gaps left by inaccurate or biased information. Further, a PSR
characteristically markets only one specific product, or at most a select handful of
products. Thus, the expectation that the PSR is capable of reviewing and educating
themselves on all of the pertinent information about a product is not unreasonable.
However, physicians are notoriously busy and have a multitude of products and therapies
that they must educate themselves about. Therefore, the expectation that a physician has
the time and capacity to independently research and become an expert on each product
she utilizes is unrealistic. The demands of their busy schedules combined with the
incredible volume of ever changing information about each treatment and therapy means
that it is often extremely difficult for a physician to be knowledgeable about all of the
important aspects of each product she uses. Thus, at least to some minimum degree,
physicians must trust the opinion of others to help inform and guide their decisions. This
means that there is often a substantial discrepancy in the knowledge that physicians have
pertaining to pharmaceuticals versus the knowledge it seems reasonable to expect PSR’s
to possess (or the knowledge they are at least presenting), placing them in a vulnerable
position regarding the information they receive from PSR’s. Since PSR’s are presented
as experts about the product they are marketing, they have the potential to be an excellent
source of information about a specific product or treatment. Even more, the impossibility
of physicians becoming experts on every treatment they employ means that they are in a
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challenging position to attempt to assess the accuracy and fairness of information they
receive. All of these considerations help to articulate why it is important that the
information presented by PSR’s be as accurate and unbiased as is possible.
However, no matter how PhARMA characterizes the interaction between PSR’s
and physicians, there is little doubt that PSR’s are salespeople. Lexchin recognizes this
dual role of PSR’s, saying that while they have the goal of increasing prescription rates,
they “are also supposed to be educators. They act as intermediaries to correct the
informational asymmetry about pharmaceuticals that exists between the drug companies
and doctors.” 92 As far as PSR’s are educators, they serve as agents of physicians. The
fact that PSR’s often operate as agents in the interests of physicians combined with the
vulnerable position of physicians regarding many products entails that that the duties of
PSR’s to physicians as educators should always eclipse their duties to the pharmaceutical
companies as salespersons. As such, “there is an obvious potential conflict of interest in
the two roles of detailers. Increasing consumption of drugs is not always compatible with
better prescribing or better health.” 93 Dangers inherent in the dual role of PSR’s means
that they must strive at all times to hold their obligations to the physicians they interact
with above the pursuit of increased prescribing. Thus, there is good reason for the
pharmaceutical industry to profess such high standards for the information provided by
PSR’s.
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2. Gift Giving:
There has been much progress made in attempts to regulate and reign in the
practice of gift giving associated with pharmaceutical detailing. PhARMA, individual
pharmaceutical companies, and the American Medical Association (AMA) have all
voluntarily adopted guidelines that severely restrict the practice. Under PhARMA’s
current guidelines, gifts have been restricted to “items primarily for the benefit of
patients” with a value of less than $100 and items of minimal value . . . primarily
associated with a health care professional’s practice (such as pens, notepads, and similar
“reminder” items with company or product logos).” 94 PhARMA’s guidelines clearly
state that gifts of “cash or cash equivalents” are not permitted, nor are items “intended for
the personal benefit of health care professionals.” While it is often unclear as to what
products can be construed as “primarily for the benefit of patients” versus “intended for
the personal benefit of health care professionals,” the voluntary implementation of these
guidelines by PhARMA indicates a commitment to eliminate the often times outlandish
gifts given in the past.
PhARMA has also instituted more restrictive guidelines concerning the
purchasing of meals for physicians. So long as they are provided in conjunction with
informational presentations or discussions, “occasional meals (but no
entertainment/recreational events) may be offered so long as they: (a) are modest as
judged by local standards; and (b) occur in a venue and manner conducive to
informational communication and provide scientific or educational value.” 95 PhARMA
has also addressed concerns raised around the practice of purchasing meals for friends
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and family of physicians by clearly stating that the “inclusion of a health care
professional’s spouse or other guests is not appropriate.” 96 Finally, the often lambasted
“dine and dash” programs, where physicians spend only a nominal period of time with
the PSR and then are allowed to leave with takeout food for the whole family have been
eliminated.
Similarly, the AMA has released its own guidelines that largely mirror those of
PhARMA. According to the AMA guidelines, “any gifts accepted by physicians
individually should primarily entail a benefit to patients and should not be of substantial
value. Accordingly, textbooks, modest meals, and other gifts are appropriate if they serve
a genuine educational function.” 97 The AMA also allows, “gifts of minimal value . . . as
long as the gifts are related to the physician’s work (e.g., pens and notepads).” 98 Similar
to PhARMA’s guidelines, gifts are to be restricted to no more than $100. Finally, meals
provided by industry must be modest and must include an educational component of
independent value. 99
Despite attempts to reform interactions between physicians and the industry,
neither the AMA, PhARMA, nor PhARMA’s constituent companies have shown a
willingness to abandon the practices of gift giving. The industry defends the practices by
arguing that gifts that are given are done so in the interest of patients. Further,
“according to PhARMA, the exchange is balanced because gifts are given as

96

Ibid, 9.
AMA, “Gifts to Physicians from Industry,” in AMA Code of Medical Ethics, E-8.061 (accessed 3/22/07).
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
97

53

compensation for the time physicians spend becoming educated about products.” 100
Thus, items such as stethoscopes, textbooks, etc. are items that would ultimately benefit
patients. Further, items of nominal value such as pens and notepads are “reminder” items
and merely serve to remind the physician of the product being promoted. Finally, the
purchasing of meals is justified by the fact that physicians are extremely busy. As a
result, it would be difficult for many PSR’s to gain access to physicians, much less spend
time sufficient to convey the detailed, complex information about the product they are
marketing, if they were not allowed to do so over meals. Despite their busy schedules
physicians still have to eat. Therefore, why not use the time wisely to educate physicians
about new pharmaceutical products? Finally, PSR’s justify the purchasing of the meal as
a customary small token of appreciation for the time spent by the physician educating
herself about the product in question.
However, despite efforts to reign in the practice of gift giving and the
justifications provided for its continued utilization, many continue to strongly object to
the practice. Critics claim that the practice of gift giving sets up a subconscious
reciprocal relationship between the physician and the PSR. There is concern that this
relationship often has strong and far reaching implications on the prescribing decisions of
physicians. If these claims can be substantiated by a sufficient body of empirical data
then there is strong circumstantial evidence that indicates that the pharmaceutical
industry uses the practice of gift giving as a means to capitalize on the subconscious
desire to reciprocate the exchange. Since there is often no mechanism by which a
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physician can return the favor other than by prescribing the PSR’s product, there is
concern that prescribing decisions are often based on such exchanges instead of on the
merits of the particular drug. Therefore, if these concerns can be substantiated by
empirical studies, there is a strong indication that despite efforts to limit the practice, and
despite arguments that attempt justified its continued use, the practice is inherently
manipulative. As such, it capitalizes on deep seated social and psychological
predispositions in order to influence prescribing behavior, undermining physicians’
rational pursuit of providing optimal care and treatment for their patients.

3. Patient Care:
Beyond concerns over deception and manipulation of health care professionals,
there is fear that interactions between industry and physicians harm patient care.
Practices that can clearly be shown to harm or endanger patient care are problematic from
both the perspective of physicians and the pharmaceutical industry. From the perspective
of pharmaceutical companies, practices that undermine patient care are worrisome
because they violate their obligation of nonmaleficence towards patients. That the
pharmaceutical industry recognizes this special relationship with patients is clearly shown
in their guiding principles. PhARMA states that all interactions with health care
professionals are, “intended to benefit patients and to enhance the practice of
medicine.” 101 Further, a review of the mission statements of the top 5 most profitable
U.S. pharmaceutical companies in 2004 102 reveals that all of the companies, with the
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exception of Bristol-Myers Squibb, include a dedication to patient care as a guiding
principle. 103 Most strongly is the statement by Merck that, “company decisions are
driven by what is right for patients.” 104 Marketing techniques that seek to promote the
use of a product at the expense of patients clearly use patients as a means to the goal of
increasing profits and violate the duty of nonmaleficence. 105 As a result, practices that
can be shown to undermine patient care should be voluntarily abandoned by the
pharmaceutical industry.
Secondly, issues surrounding patient care are even more worrisome from the
perspective of physicians. If it can be shown that the practices surrounding DTP
marketing negatively influence patient care then physicians not only frustrate the rational
pursuit of health and treatment by their patients, but in violating their fiduciary duties
they also deceive their patients. Thus, if claims that practices surrounding DTP
marketing clearly harm patient care are substantiated then physicians are in violation of
their duty to be trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient care and have a strong
moral imperative to avoid interactions with the pharmaceutical industry.
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4. Accuracy and Bias:
Claims that information provided by PSR’s is unreliable and biased are
notoriously difficult to substantiate. Judgments about accuracy and bias are often highly
subjective. Even more, interactions between PSR’s and physicians are generally one-onone, at a private table or behind closed doors. Thus, as is pointed out by Ziegler et al,
“the one-on-one interaction between a pharmaceutical representative and a physician is
hard to regulate.” 106 Ashley Wazana’s landmark analysis of 538 studies regarding the
interaction between industry and physicians concluded that most physicians “believe that
representatives provide accurate information about their drugs,” however, they “are
equivocal in their beliefs that representatives could provide accurate information on
established or alternative drugs.” 107 Yet, the claim that PSR’s provide information that is
strongly biased, and in this sense unreliable, seems to be almost universally accepted in
the literature. Wazana notes that most physicians believe that PSR’s “prioritize product
promotion above patients’ welfare.” 108 Not surprisingly, there are numerous articles that
discuss the problems inherent in utilizing information provided by PSR’s, all recognizing
that information provided is not likely to be balanced or fair. 109 Even more, there are
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numerous articles that attempt to provide guidance to physicians in an attempt to help
them separate the useful information from biased, unreliable information. 110
Beyond a mere predominance of opinion within the profession and the literature,
there are a precious few studies that have attempted to objectively determine the accuracy
and reliability of information provided by PSR’s. The first of these studies was
conducted by Elina Hemminki in 1977. The study analyzed the information provided in
forty-six presentations. Hemminki found that in almost half of the presentations given
PSR’s did not mention side-effects and contraindications, even though they were listed in
the Remedia Fennica. Other drugs for the same condition were often mentioned,
however, in 78% of the cases the drug was preferred to the alternative drug, and 19% of
the time the alternative was said to be equally good in principle but the presented drug
was better because of some special feature. 111
In 1986 Hemminki conducted a follow-up study. Once again strong indications
of bias and disturbing omissions were observed. In this study Hemminki found that side
effects were not mentioned in contradiction to the drug catalogue 67% of the time, up
from 44% in the 1977 study. Contraindications were omitted 65% of the time, up from
46% in 1977. Once again competing treatments were often mentioned and 82% of the
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comparisons favored the PSR’s drug. In 18% of the comparisons the drugs were
presented equally but the PSR’s drug was never the drug of second choice. 112
A third study was conducted in 1995 by Ziegler et al. The study found that out of
a sample of 106 statements made by twelve pharmaceutical reps in 13 presentations, that
twelve, or 11% of the statements, were inaccurate. 113 In order to be considered
inaccurate the statements had to contradict prescribing information in the 1993
Physicians’ Desk Reference or literature quoted or handed out by the sales representative,
a pharmacist and a physician had to independently assess the statement as incorrect, and a
search of reference books, drug company brochures, and MEDLINE files provided no
support for the statement. Of the inaccurate statements identified, all were favorable
towards the drug being marketed and several could have been dangerous if taken at face
value. While seemingly minor, an 11% rate of inaccurate statements is still significant
and should raise concerns over the accuracy of the information being provided by
pharmaceutical reps. Even more worrisome is the fact that these presentations were
delivered in the presence of at least one faculty physician and with the knowledge that the
presentation was being taped. Both of these factors raise concerns over whether a greater
incidence of inaccurate statements may be common in circumstances of one-on-one
meetings between reps and physicians. Certainly, it seems unlikely that the rate of
inaccurate statements would be smaller in this context. Further, the study found that 49%
of statements made about the promoted drug were favorable, 31% were neutral, and only
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19% were unfavorable. 114 The same study also found that all of the statements made
about a competitor’s drug were unfavorable and that the reps “usually do not mention
adverse effects or better alternative agents.” 115
However, the findings of the three studies must be considered critically. The
relevance of the Hemminki studies may be questionable both because of their age and the
fact that they took place in Finland. Yet, despite the fact that the studies were conducted
in Finland the pharmaceutical companies represented were multinational corporations,
many residing in the United States. Therefore, it seems reasonable that these
corporations should hold the PSR’s to the same standards in each country they operate in.
Certainly, codes of conduct concerning interactions with health care professionals are
meant to apply universally to all employees of these multinational corporations, with the
only exception being when local laws are more restrictive than the policies outlined in the
codes. As for concerns over the age of the studies, these objections may be mitigated by
the fact that each successively more recent study seems to substantiate the conclusions of
the earlier studies. Finally, the fact that the Ziegler et al study was conducted in the
United States with similar findings to the two earlier Finnish studies helps to assuage
concerns that the findings are unique to Finland.
There is even reason to be concerned that PSR’s may not be sufficiently educated
to provide the reliable information that it seems reasonable to expect them to provide.
Carl Elliot has highlighted this issue in discussing what is apparently a common
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sentiment of PSR’s. Elliot quotes one PSR as saying that “Reps are the last to know”
about potential problems with their drugs. 116 Concerns over the knowledge possessed by
PSR’s are mirrored in another study conducted by Hemminki. The study found that there
was a tendency to emphasize capabilities as a salesperson over technical knowledge and
education in advertisements for job openings for PSR positions. Hemminki presented
PSR’s with thirteen statements which they were asked to agree or disagree with. The
mean percentage of correct answers was 62% and the study concluded that “some
representatives’ knowledge about clinical trials and tetrogenicity, two cardinal elements
in their information, was inadequate.” 117 Again the age of the study and the fact that it
took place in Finland raises concerns over the relevance of the findings. However, the
fact that again most of the PSR’s worked for multinational corporations seems to suggest
that the findings may be relatively safely extrapolated to PSR’s in the United States.
Finally, there is disturbing evidence to suggest that even when PSR’s restrict
themselves to empirical data regarding the merits of their drug versus a competitor’s, that
the information may still be strongly biased. A study by Daniel Safer reviews recently
published pharmaceutical industry sponsored comparative psychotropic drug trials in an
attempt to discern whether design and reporting modifications are utilized to alter results
in favor of the sponsoring company’s drug. Safer discovered thirteen mechanisms
through which studies are tailored to benefit the sponsoring company’s drug. These are;
using doses outside the usual range for competitive advantage, substantially altering the
dose schedule of the comparison drug for competitive advantage, using self-serving
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measurement scales and making misleading conclusions from measurement findings,
selecting the major findings and endpoints post hoc, masking unfavorable side effects,
repeatedly publishing the same or similar positive studies to increase the impact,
selectively highlighting findings favorable to the sponsor, editorializing for the sponsor in
the abstract, publishing the obvious to emphasize a point, touting nonsignificant but
favorable differences and negating dropout difference statistically, selecting subjects and
altering the duration of trials to achieve a favorable outcome, withholding unfavorable
results, and masking sponsorship. The result is that “an estimated 89 to 98% of
comparative drug treatment studies funded by pharmaceutical companies yield results
that are favorable to their company’s product.” 118
Hence, there is very strong, persuasive evidence that suggests that the information
provided by PSR’s is not the reliable, unbiased educative tool the industry defends it as
being. As such, the presentation of such biased and unreliable information is inherently
deceptive and manipulative of the physicians it is directed towards. PSR’s provide
physicians with incomplete or misleading information with the goal of encouraging
physicians to prescribe or increase their prescribing of the medication in question. As far
as the physician believes this information to be reliable and makes decisions in the
interests of their patients, the rational, autonomous capacity of physicians is used by the
PSR in order to achieve their goal of increasing sales. Hence, the physician is used as a
mere tool for the achievement of the PSR’s goal of increasing sales, not as an end-inhimself. Hence, such practices are a clear violation of the principle of; pharmaceutical
companies are obligated to be trustworthy in their marketing practices. Therefore, it is
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imperative for the pharmaceutical industry to abandon such practices and for physicians
to recognize the dangers inherent in interactions with PSR’s and discontinue contact with
them.

63

5. Manipulation Through Gifts:
Much easier to substantiate than claims of bias and inaccuracy are concerns that
the practice of gift giving undermines the physician’s ability to make rational prescribing
decisions. There is an enormous body of social science data that examines the impact of
gift giving. Evidence suggests that when a gift of any size is presented it creates a sense
of indebtedness in the recipient. 119 Some even claim that reciprocal behavior is an
adaptive mechanism that has helped advance human society. 120 Additionally, the degree
that the recipient feels an obligation to reciprocate does not seem to be related to the size
of the gift. 121 Even more, there is evidence that suggests that we are more receptive to
information when it is received while eating. 122 Finally, pharmaceutical companies
employ highly educated and intelligent marketers and it seems safe to assume that they
would not invest the substantial resources in terms of time, money, and manpower in the
providing of gifts to physicians if they were not aware of the impact that such practices
have. Thus, there is a substantial body of social science data that indicates that the
practices of gift giving by pharmaceutical companies capitalizes on deep seated social
and psychological tendencies to try and reciprocate.
Even more disturbing is that this tendency operates on a subconscious level and as
a result goes largely unrecognized and is denied by physicians. Wazana’s analysis shows
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that “most [physicians] deny that gifts could influence their behavior.” 123 Physicians
maintain that they still make rational, deliberate choices in their prescribing practices
despite accepting gifts. However, as Dana and Lowenstein point out, “the deliberate
choice view is inconsistent with social science research, which shows that even when
individuals try to be objective, their judgments are subject to an unconscious and
unintentional self-serving bias.” 124 Hence, despite the conviction by physicians that they
are not influenced by gifts, social science data suggests that this is merely a self-serving
bias that justifies their acceptance of gifts. This conclusion is supported by findings by
Wazana that show that, “receiving a gift and the number of gifts received correlated with
the belief that pharmaceutical representatives have no impact on prescribing behavior.” 125
All of these findings illustrate how the practice of gift-giving serves to manipulate
physicians in order to alter their prescribing behavior. The fact that the resulting
obligations to reciprocate are largely subconscious and that physicians seem incapable of
detecting the influence raises serious concerns over the practice. Even more, findings
that indicate that the size of the gift has little impact on the resulting obligation to
reciprocate has led Dana and Lowenstein to conclude that, “policies that make sense if
bias as interpreted as a matter of deliberate choice (e.g., limiting gift size, educational
initiatives, and mandatory disclosure of interests) are unlikely to be effective if bias is in
fact unintentional and unconscious.” 126 That the practice so effectively alters behavior
should not be a surprise, otherwise why would the industry continue to defend gift-giving
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so fervently? As a result, it seems clear that, “the main objective of drug company giftgiving is to create relationships and interests on the part of recipient physicians that
conflict with their primary obligation to act in the best interest of their patients.” 127
Thus, the practice is clearly manipulative and a violation of respect for the
physicians PSR’s interact with. In this case, nonrational means are utilized to influence
the prescribing decisions of physicians. Physicians, in fulfillment of their fiduciary
responsibilities, have the goal of making prescribing decisions that are in the best
interests of their patients. By utilizing such nonrational means to influence the physician,
PSR’s subvert this goal and undermine the physician’s ability to make prescribing
decisions that are in the best interests of patients. Hence, such manipulative practices use
physicians as a mere means for the realization of the ends of PSR’s. Again, this clearly
violates the first principle of; pharmaceutical companies are obligated to be trustworthy
in their marketing practices.
However, many physicians welcome such interactions either due to the gifts they
receive or because of the social reassurance they receive through the relationships they
develop with PSR’s. It seems reasonable to assume that many, if not most, physicians do
not believe that these interactions influence them in the manner and to the degree that
they do. 128 To the degree that physicians are aware of these influences and are complicit
in these interactions, they do not properly respect the humanity of their patients and their
goal of improving their health. For those physicians who do not realize the impact such
interactions often entail, it is beyond time for them to acknowledge the overwhelming
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evidence that indicates that despite their belief such interactions have no impact on their
decision making that they do in fact have a substantial and pervasive influence.
Regardless, physicians must recognize the fact that such interactions threaten their ability
to make decisions in the best interests of their patients and as such, violate their fiduciary
responsibilities and the second principle of, physicians are obligated to be trustworthy in
their decisions regarding patient care. Therefore, it is once again imperative for the
pharmaceutical industry to recognize the immoral nature of the practice and discontinue
its use. On the other hand, it is also vital for physicians to recognize the preponderance
of social science data that shows that the receiving of gifts does have a substantial impact
on decision making and avoid the practice in the interest of being trustworthy in their
interactions with patients and fulfill their fiduciary duties.

6. Harming Patients:
The issues surrounding the effects of DTP marketing on prescribing practices
become more complicated when examined from the perspective of patient care. DTP
marketing is clearly linked to prescribing practices that threaten the care of patients.
Again, Wazana’s landmark study is vital here. Wazana concluded that:
Most studies found negative outcomes associated with the interaction. These
included an impact on knowledge (inability to identify wrong claims about
medication), attitude (positive attitude toward pharmaceutical representatives;
awareness, preference, and rapid prescription of a new drug), and behavior
(making formulary requests for medications that rarely held important advantages
over existing ones; nonrational prescribing behavior; increasing prescription rate;
prescribing fewer generic but more expensive, newer medications at no
demonstrated advantage. 129
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Even more, studies suggest that prescribing decisions are often based on the influencing
factors of pharmaceutical reps instead of being based on concern for which therapy
options may best serve the patient. 130 These findings also substantiate the concerns
raised above about the manipulative and deceptive nature of interactions between
pharmaceutical reps and physicians. If information was reliable and unbiased it is
reasonable to assume that such pervasive, negative effects would not be so
overwhelmingly associated with interactions between physicians and PSR’s. It is also
clear that the practice of DTP marketing negatively impacts quality of care through
improper prescribing, excessive prescribing, and the early adoption of newer, less proven,
and possibly more dangerous medications. 131
The dangers inherent in prescription drugs are well documented and are a primary
reason for the prescribing system we use. Thus, prescribing of unnecessary drugs to
patients places them at risk of potentially dangerous side effects. Further, excessive
prescribing of a medication in many cases may also lead to increased risk of dangerous
side effects and of overdose. Finally, prescribing patients medications that are not the
best option for the treatment in question means that the treatment will likely not be as
effective and may even fail.
Newcomer notes that, “researchers studying elderly patients found that 38 percent
of those who received antidepressants, 19 percent who received oral hypoglycemics, 18
percent who received sedatives, and 13 percent who received nonsteroidal anti130
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inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) were given a potentially inappropriate drug.” 132 The
highly influential study by Lucian Leape et al, in the 80’s showed that 3.7% of
hospitalized patients had disabling injuries caused by their medical treatment, of which
prescribing error was the number-one contributing factor. 133 Additionally, according to a
study by Phillips et al, death certificates from 1993 showed that 7,391 deaths resulted
from medication errors in America. 134 Even more unsettling is the claim that the “study
seriously underestimates rates by recording only those cases actually identified by the
physician.” 135 I am not trying to claim that these results were usually or even
predominantly caused by the influences of PSR’s. Many of these errors may be
attributed to problems such as misplacing decimal points when writing a dosage and
similar mistakes. However, these accounts do serve to illustrate the dangers inherent in
improper prescribing and indicate that great care need be taken to assure that proper
prescribing does occur. Hence, to the degree that the influence of PSR’s does negatively
affect prescribing decisions this poses a serious risk to patients.
Particularly worrisome is the incredible effectiveness of DTP marketing in
encouraging physicians to quickly adopt new, more expensive medications. Enthusiastic
adoption of new pharmaceuticals raises serious safety concerns. Since harmful sideeffects are often not identified until a drug has been on the market for several years, a
policy of cautious, gradual adoption instead of rapid prescribing of new pharmaceuticals
132
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seems to be the best strategy from the perspective of patient care.136 An example that
illustrates this problem is the heavy prescribing of Cox-2 arthritis medications. These are
drugs that were heavily promoted both to physicians and directly to consumers.
However, “studies show that the medicines are not more effective for pain relief that their
predecessors were.” 137 Their only advantage over standard aspirin for the relief of pain is
their presumed decrease in the occurrence of stomach ulcers. Yet, “UnitedHealth Group
pharmacy data show[s] that Cox-2 drugs now account for 40 percent of all prescription
costs in this class, but only 14 percent of patients receiving the drugs have arthritis.” 138
The problem of such rapid acceptance of a new therapy that has minimal advantages over
existing drugs is highlighted by the heavily covered case of the withdrawal of Vioxx, a
Cox-2 drug, from the market by Merck in 2004 after it was linked to increases in heart
attack and stroke. If the data from UnitedHealth Group is any indication, many of those
who were placed at risk or suffered adverse side-affects from Vioxx did so when they had
no medical need for the drug or an existing therapy would have proved just as effective.
The dangers inherent in improper prescribing are obvious. Excessive and improper
prescribing can have debilitating effects on patients and in certain cases can even lead to
death. The fact that DTP marketing techniques are so incredibly effective at altering
prescribing behavior, often for the worse, means that many patients are invariable harmed
136
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by the practice. Thus, pharmaceutical companies often harm patients in the pursuit of
profits in clear violation of the third principle of; pharmaceutical companies have a duty
of nonmaleficence with regard to the patients who utilize their products. The harm done
also serves to highlight just how far such interactions threaten the fiduciary
responsibilities of physicians to their patients. Not only are many physicians not
prescribing the best treatment for their patients, but evidence suggests that many
physicians are directly causing serious harm to their patients through improper
prescribing that has been heavily influenced by interactions with PSR’s. Therefore, these
findings further illustrate how such interactions serve to violate the duty of physicians to
be trustworthy in their decisions regarding patient care.
.
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Chapter 4
Health Care Expenditures

The final and most difficult aspect of DTP marketing is the claim that it
unnecessarily drives up health care spending. Many have strong moral intuitions that
there is something wrong with practices that unnecessarily or wastefully increase health
expenditures; however, it is difficult to articulate what precisely is wrong with it.
Companies that operate in the health care industry are in it to make money. However, the
realization of the aims of increasing profits cannot come at the cost of the sustainability
of the industry.

1. Reason for Concern:
As of 2004, nation health expenditures (NHE) in the United States reached nearly
$1.9 trillion and accounted for 16% of the GDP. These figures are up from $966 billion
or 13.7% of GDP ten years earlier. Even more disturbing is the fact that these trends are
accelerating, seeing a 2.2% increase in consumption of GDP from 2000 to 2004. 139 Such
alarming acceleration in health care spending raises concerns about the sustainability of
our current health care system. With spending continuing to outpace the growth of the
economy, it is inevitable that without reform this trend will eventually end in the collapse
of our health care system. The demise of the health care industry raises sweeping
concerns far outside the scope of mere economic considerations. With the failure of our
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health care system, it will be difficult and even impossible to find and receive the care
that saves so many lives today.
Additionally, in 2003 health care spending on pharmaceuticals reached $179.2
billion. This only accounted for 11% of NHE in 2003, compared with hospital care
(31%) and physician services (22%). However, pharmaceutical spending has increased at
the highest rate of any component of NHE since 1990. While this trend climaxed in
1999, with a rate of increase of 20%, the 11% increase in 2003 still exceeded increases in
hospital care (7%) and physician services (9%). Even more worrisome is the fact that
while cost containment measures enacted in the 80’s and 90’s had at least limited success
in restraining cost increases in both hospital care and physician services, these measures
had little or no impact on the rates of increase on pharmaceutical spending. As of 2003
the rate of increase for hospital care is 50% lower and the rate of increase for physician
services is 31% lower than in 1980, yet increases in spending on pharmaceuticals is 27%
higher. Thus, while pharmaceutical spending only makes up 11% of NHE, this rate will
likely continue to climb. 140 Certainly, in the increasingly fragile system we find
ourselves faced with, these expenditures warrant examination.
These incredible rates of increase in spending have already had striking
ramifications. Between 2004 and 2005, 1.3 million additional Americans became
uninsured. This brought the percentage of non-elderly uninsured Americans to nearly
18%. Increases in spending in all sectors of health care serve to drive up health insurance
premiums. Rising premiums coupled with the economic downturn in 2001 are seen as
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the primary reasons for such large increases in the number of uninsured. 141 As a
significant component of increasing health care expenditures, pharmaceutical spending
bears some of the responsibility for this. Even more, increases in pharmaceutical
spending has resulted in the establishment of tiered, cost-sharing formulas and increased
drug copayments. In 2005, 74% of workers with employer sponsored coverage had costsharing arrangements with 3 or 4 tiers, 27% higher than workers in 2000. Average
copayments for non-formulary drugs doubled from $17 in 2000 to $35 in 2005 and
average copayments for formulary drugs increased from $13 in 2000 to $22 in 2005, an
increase of 69%. 142 Thus, increases in health care expenditures are strongly tied to the
rising number of Americans without health insurance. Even more, rising drug costs have
clearly resulted in increasing out of pocket spending by those who still have coverage.
Therefore, in a fragile industry striving to maintain viability, any sector that
shows exorbitant profits begs the question as to whether this is money well spent. For
decades the pharmaceutical industry has been one of the most successful industries in the
world. In fact, the industry has been the most profitable industry in America for most of
the last decade, only recently slipping to fifth, with a 15.7% return on revenues in
2006. 143 Even more, the pharmaceutical industry has seen a return of between 14.3% and
18.6% for the last ten years. This is compared to a median return of 5.2% for all Fortune
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500 companies in 2004, the highest median return in the last 10 years. 144 With the health
care industry struggling to survive, how can the pharmaceutical industry justify such
huge profits?
Finally, a key component to the incredible profitability of the pharmaceutical
industry has been the incredible success of advertising. The pharmaceutical industry
pours vast sums of money into advertising, increasing the rate every year. In 2004,
pharmaceutical companies spent an average of 32% of their revenues on marketing,
advertising, and administration, 145 up from 27% in 2001.

2. Health Care as a Distinct Business Model:
Problems of inefficiency and unprudential expenditures of resources are usually
not a major problem within business due to corrective market forces. For instance, as one
company begins to introduce newer more expensive products with little or no advantage
over older ones, new companies step up and offer products that do offer advantages at a
similar price or sell a similar product at a cheaper price. However, pharmaceuticals are
highly problematic in this regard. Pharmaceutical companies are granted strong
monopoly rights over their medications. Thus, there is little capacity for competing
companies to step in and offer a similar product at a cheaper price. Even more, the
highly technical nature of pharmaceuticals, coupled with the lengthy process of testing
and approval, means that often a pharmaceutical company may have no competition for
many years. These problems are exacerbated by the complex relationships involved in
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prescribing drugs. Patients are the primary consumers; however, insurance companies
are the primary purchasers of the medication. Even more complicated is the fact that
physicians make the ultimate choice as to which medication to prescribe. So offering a
product at a cheaper rate does not have the same competitive force that it has in an open
market. Since both the physicians and the patients generally have little or no interest in
the amount being charged to the insurance company, they are minimally affected by
differences in price. The system of sharing costs through insurance also means that,
unlike in the standard business model where the impact of financial decisions are
generally restricted to the customer paying for the product or service and the vendor
selling them, that financial decisions in the health care industry have a far reaching
impact on all who participate in the system. Finally, the highly technical nature of
pharmaceuticals makes it exceedingly difficult to determine the advantages and
disadvantages of one product over another.
Thus, we begin to see why comparisons between health care businesses and the
standard business model tend to fail. The allowance of strong monopoly rights combined
with the highly technical nature of pharmaceuticals results in stifled competition.
Further, the highly complex system, where physicians determine treatments, patients
receive them, and insurance companies pay for them, means that pricing plays a
minimum role in the choice of products or treatments. Additionally, as noted above,
increases in spending in one sector of health care have widespread ramifications in all
other sectors. To illustrate this let’s look at pharmaceuticals. Increased drug spending
affects insurance companies. In order to compensate for increased spending, insurance
companies raise premiums, which negatively affects patients and institute cost
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management procedures that limit procedures and medications that physicians may
employ in the treatment of disease. Therefore, it should be apparent that the health care
industry departs from the standard business model in important ways that raise serious
concerns when we analyze the implications of unprudential expenditure of health care
resources.

3. A Means or an End?
The first tact in addressing considerations of health care spending is to approach it
from the perspective of patients. If DTP marketing does needlessly drive up health care
spending then it is often patients that feel that impact. Granted, much of the effect is
indirect since insurance companies bear the brunt of actual health care spending.
However, there is certainly a trickle down effect through increases in insurance rates. As
health care spending continues to rise, insurance companies are forced to increase their
premiums in order to keep up. As a result, it is patients that pay for these increases
through higher premiums. Further, as insurance rates increase; greater numbers of
patients are priced out of coverage. Without coverage, the implications of unnecessary
health care spending are even more dramatic as the full cost is carried by individual
patients. The result is that many patients will not be able to afford the care that they
need. If these claims may be substantiated then, by financially harming patients, DTP
marketing is a clear violation of the third principle of; pharmaceutical companies have a
duty of nonmaleficence with regard to the patients who utilize their products. Further,
since it is clear just how fragile the health care industry is, if the claims that DTP
marketing unnecessarily drive up health care spending are confirmed then those practices
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also violate the fourth principle of, pharmaceutical companies are obligated to not
undermine the prudential expenditure of limited health care resources.

4. Me-too Drugs:
The most complex aspect of the debate surrounding DTP marketing is the claim
that it drives up health care spending. Despite the huge expenditures by the industry,
money spent on marketing is not passed on directly to the consumer through higher drug
prices. This is because of the incredible success of DTP marketing. One study found that
for each dollar spent on detailing, there was a return of $10.29 for large, new products
and no less than $1.27 on older products. 146 Thus, money spent on DTP marketing is
more than made up for by increases in revenues.
However, the adoption and rapid prescribing of new, more expensive drugs over
cheaper existing treatments and the mistaken prescribing of medications to individuals
who do not suffer from the corresponding condition have the obvious cumulative effect
of increasing health care costs. Yet, the avenue through which DTP marketing seems to
drive up health care spending the most is by creating a market for so called “me-too”
drugs. These are drugs that are developed with little or no advantage over existing
therapies. However, despite strong indications that they have no distinct advantages over
existing alternatives, they are touted as “new and improved.” Thus, physicians and
patients are led to believe that these new treatments offer some special advantage over the
existing alternative. The success of DTP marketing and its ability to alter prescribing
practices and encourage formulary requests where, “most of the requested drugs
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presented little or no therapeutic advantage over existing formulary drugs,” 147 means that
a market for drugs is often created merely by marketing efforts instead of due to reported
benefits. In this environment it is easy to see why there would be significant motivation
to research and develop a new drug based on the makeup of an existing product. Since
demand for the drug may be effectively created by aggressive marketing to physicians,
there is no need to spend the time, money, and effort to create a new, truly innovative
drug. Further, the attrition rate for the development of new drugs is widely cited as one
of the primary expenses involved in the research and development of a new medication.
However, the success rate may be dramatically improved if a drug is based on a slight
alteration of the molecular formula of an already successful drug. This practice is
encouraged by the patent process, which requires only slight modification on a formula
and proof that the therapy is more effective than a placebo, not more effective than
existing alternatives, in order to obtain a new patent. Finally, with blockbuster drugs
bringing in over $1 billion in revenues, and often developed for chronic conditions which
will maintain sales over extended periods, gaining even a mediocre percentage of the
market share, especially with decreased R&D costs, provides a significant incentive to
produce me-too drugs. Even further, since these newer drugs will have a more recent
patent that extends exclusive rights beyond those of the currently existing competitor’s
drug, market share should increase over time as the competing drug is phased out through
direct generic competition.
Of course the pharmaceutical industry denies that this happens. They claim that
development of me-too drugs largely stems from projects that are independently
147
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developed simultaneously between two companies. They further claim that the industry
is driven by small, incremental developments over existing molecular formulas as much
as it is by large leaps in the development of new molecular entities (NMEs). That NMEs
are no guarantee of improvements in therapy is supported by the example of Cox-2 drugs,
which offered no significant advantages for pain relief over existing therapies. However,
there is also little evidence to suggest that significant benefits are obtained from slight
alterations to existing drugs. 148 This has led Marcia Angell to conclude that; “the idea
that patients respond differently to me-too drugs is merely an untested – and self-serving
hypothesis.” 149 Certainly, if this is a defense that the industry wishes to continue to
utilize they must find stronger support for it than currently exists.
However, it is extremely difficult to determine which therapies are me-too drugs
and which are truly beneficial and innovative new therapies. The primary hindrance to
identifying which drugs are me-too’s is that the FDA merely requires that pharmaceutical
companies show that a new drug is more effective than a placebo instead of requiring
head-to-head comparisons with the most effective existing treatment option. This
practice makes it exceedingly difficult to determine the relative merits of a new drug over
existing alternatives. This has led Angell to call for the FDA to reform their approval
process and require pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate a significant advantage
over existing treatment options before they are approved. By instituting a more stringent
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approval process, “there would be far fewer me-too drugs, because not many of them
would pass that test. The companies would have no choice but to look for important new
drugs, instead of taking the easier and cheaper route of spinning out old ones.” 150 This
would have the additional benefit of removing one of the primary motivations for
aggressive DTP marketing since truly beneficial and innovative new drugs tend to market
themselves.
Yet despite difficulties involved in the identification of me-too drugs, it is
possible to get a rough idea of the relative predominance of these types of medications.
What is shown is that there is a striking prevalence of these drugs compared to
innovative, beneficial therapies. In order to determine this we may look to the FDA’s
classification of new drugs as an indication of the prevalence of me-too’s. In 2004, 31
(27%) of the 113 newly approved drugs were NMEs. Only 25 (22%) of the 113 were
classified as having a “significant improvement compared to marketed products in the
treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease,” with only 17 of the NMEs falling under
that category. 151 Even more troubling is that, with the exception of the last two years,
these ratios have steadily fallen over the last 15 years while marketing expenditures have
increased over the same period.152 While it may be argued that these classifications
underestimate the beneficial potential of new pharmaceuticals, the data clearly indicates a
troublesome predominance of me-too drugs.
Adding to the evidence above is the fact that the problem of more expensive metoo drugs flooding the market has become so widespread that Consumer Reports has
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begun to analyze comparative studies in an attempt to aid patients in the selection of the
best treatment for their money. As of now, there are sixteen distinct conditions with
sufficient me-too drugs to warrant a study by Consumer Reports. An examination of
these reports shows concrete examples of more expensive, patent protected me-too drugs
that offer no significant advantage over existing treatments, and help to illustrate how
much the adoption of these more expensive treatments escalates health care spending.
A prime example of the introduction of these more expensive me-too drugs is the
development of Prilosec. When Prilosec, AstraZeneca’s blockbuster heartburn
medication went off patent protection, they poured enormous amounts into the marketing
of Nexium, the next “purple pill.” Further, there are now three additional proton pump
inhibitors; Prevacid, Protonix, and Aciphex. Now that Prilosec has gone off patent
protection and is available over-the-counter, it costs an average of $24 a month. This is
compared with an average monthly cost of $245 on the high end and $119 on the low end
for alternative, prescription treatments. Yet, Prilosec is “as effective for most people as
the more expensive prescription alternatives.” 153
Another example is Claritin. The first of the new generation of antihistamines,
Claritin was a huge blockbuster for Schering-Plough. Once again, several alternative
treatments quickly followed, in this case; Zyrtec, Clarinex, and Allegra. Claritin, now
sold over-the-counter and available as a generic, costs as little as $3 a month. This is
compared to the patent protected alternatives which range in monthly price from a high of
$182 to a low of $52. This while “analysis indicates that the four second-generation
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antihistamines do not differ in any consistent way in either effectiveness or safety or the
side effects they cause.” 154 Such therapies illustrate how dramatically aggressive
prescribing of patent protected alternatives drives up health care spending.
These examples help to paint a picture of the business structure of pharmaceutical
companies, where high expenditures on DTP marketing create a market for noninnovative, me-too drugs. Adding to the problem of me-too drugs is the way that
pharmaceutical companies utilize deceptive and manipulative practices in order to alter
the prescribing practices of physicians. The success of DTP marketing techniques means
that, more often than not, the competitive effect of cheaper, generic alternatives can be
effectively mitigated. Further, me-too drugs are not inherently a form of competition.
They cannot be tied to lowered prices, nor are they marketed as cheaper than competing
patent protected alternatives. This has led Angell to conclude that, “the me-too market
operates more like an oligopoly than like a competitive market; it is simply expanded and
shared.” 155 Thus, through the mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3, the pharmaceutical
industry encourages the adoption of these newer, more expensive medications that offer
little or no advantage over existing treatments. When combined with a system where
there are limited incentives to seek the cheapest treatment option, the result is a system
where me-too drugs dominate. 156 Since new drugs carry high price tags due to strong
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monopoly protection, this trend dramatically increases health care spending, which is in
turn born by patients and insurance companies. This financial harm directly violates the
third principle of; pharmaceutical companies have a duty of nonmaleficence with regard
to the patients who utilize their products. It is also vital to recognize that since these metoo drugs carry no significant advantages over existing alternative treatments, yet carry
exponentially higher price tags, by encouraging the adoption and prescribing of me-too
drugs through DTP marketing, the pharmaceutical industry greatly undermines the
prudential expenditure of health care resources and threatens the sustainability of the
industry as a whole. As such, DTP marketing violates the fourth principle of;
pharmaceutical companies are obligated to not undermine the prudential expenditure of
limited health care resources.

expensive drug option is not solely born by the patient who makes that choice. Instead it is born by all the
individuals who share health coverage with that individual, raising issues of justice. Thus, while a decision
to spend additional money on a luxury item generally only affects the person who makes that choice,
decisions to utilize more expensive treatment options have far reaching effects on a multitude of
individuals.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

It should now be clear that DTP marketing ultimately manipulates and deceives
physicians. Further, DTP marketing is clearly tied to negative influences on prescribing
behavior that undermines the patient, physician relationship and endangers patients’ care.
Finally, as the primary mechanism through which a market for me-too drugs is created,
DTP marketing drives up health care spending. For all of these reasons there is a strong
moral imperative for PhARMA and the AMA to voluntarily instituted measures that ban
the practices discussed here. However, even if a voluntary ban is enacted by PhARMA
and the AMA, this is not the end of the story. It is vital for us to consider the possible
ramifications of such a ban and to attempt to determine how, and in what form the
industry may continue to function.

1. Can the Industry Regulate Itself?
Despite a clear moral imperative for both PhARMA and the AMA to voluntarily
abandon the practices of DTP marketing, there is strong reason to doubt their ability to
effectively curtail such exchanges. Previous discussions serve to starkly illustrate the
corrupting influences of profit. DTP marketing is the primary mechanism through which
the industry maintains the huge profits they have come to enjoy for so long. It is naïve in
the extreme to expect them to readily discard their most effective tool for generating
profits. Even more, there is evidence that companies are already abandoning the modest
reforms that have been only recently enacted. Kassirer claims that, “already, less than a
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year after the PhARMA guidelines were issued, there is evidence that the companies are
violating their own guidelines on meals, and despite the new AMA guidelines, physicians
are still accepting their invitations.”157
Further, limitations on the types and size of gifts to physicians and strong
curtailment of PSR’s ability “wine and dine” physicians has resulted in greater efforts
being expended in the less well regulated area of continuing medical education (CME).
Physicians are increasingly utilized as so called “thought” or “opinion leaders.” These
physicians speak on behalf of pharmaceutical companies about certain drugs and usually
receive substantial honorariums in return. 158 The rise of such practices can be traced to
the institution of more restrictive codes of conduct by PhARMA and the AMA.
Worrisome practices such as these have led Kassirer to conclude that, “gifts and subsidies
are so important to the marketing efforts of industry that the companies will undoubtedly
find creative ways to continue the largesse.” 159
Physicians are complicit in the failure of reform as well. Despite a strong
professional ethic, physicians are only human and the corrupting influence of money is
all too well known. More importantly, is the fact that studies show that for the most part
physicians feel they are immune to the influencing effects of gifts. 160 As long as
physicians are unwilling to recognize the dramatic affects that can be correlated to the
acceptance of gifts from industry, they are unlikely to voluntarily abandon such practices.
Thus, if physicians and the industry are not capable of effective self-regulation then this

157

Kassirer, 10.
Angell, Elliot, and Kassirer.
159
Kassirer, 9-10.
160
Wazana,
158

86

opens the door for federal regulation of interactions between industry and health care
professionals.

2. Academic Detailing:
There is additional concern that by banning the practice of pharmaceutical
detailing, physicians will lose access to one of their primary sources of information on
new drugs and therapies. While there is good reason to doubt the value of information
provided by PSR’s, the question of where physicians should turn to find reliable
information about pharmaceuticals remains. Of even greater concern is the fact that
comparative studies of competing therapies are predominantly funded by pharmaceutical
companies. Clearly, industry funding of such comparative studies invites the inclusion of
dangerous bias and the tweaking of studies to benefit the sponsoring company’s drug. 161
Thus, information provided by the industry and industry funded studies all raise concerns
over the corrupting influence of profit and illustrate the difficulties inherent in
eliminating bias. However, a reliable alternative to industry sponsored detailing already
exists. Indications show that attempts made by academic institutions to conduct
independently funded research and to independently disseminate the results of such
studies have been immensely successful at removing inaccuracy and bias from research
and information provided to physicians, clearly demonstrating the superiority of such an
approach.
However, there is still the question of who is to foot the bill for such independent
research. There may be strong reasons for insurance companies to wish to support such
161
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efforts since decreased prescribing of more expensive therapies with little or no
advantage would be financially beneficial to insurance companies. Further, since
pharmaceutical companies will no longer be able to rely on DTP marketing to promote
their drugs, they will have to rely on the merits of the drugs themselves. As a result,
companies will have to concentrate on developing truly innovative and beneficial
therapies. If this change of focus does in fact occur, then it will be in the best interests of
the industry to fund independent research since this will be the only remaining
mechanism through which pharmaceutical companies may be able to encourage the use
of their product. Further, funding of independent research would represent only a small
portion of the extravagant expenditures currently directed towards marketing.
Additionally, it can be argued that the pharmaceutical industry has an obligation to fund
such independent research. As discussed previously, the industry’s duties to physicians
and patients extend beyond mere negative duties, and include positive duties to aid both
in the pursuit of the best treatment and health care. Again, these duties are reflected in
the mission statements of nearly all of the most profitable U.S. pharmaceutical
companies. Therefore, funding of reliable, independent research would likely be the
most effective mechanism through which pharmaceutical companies may fulfill these
obligations to patients and physicians. Finally, there are already extensive and costly
demands that we have seen fit to place on the pharmaceutical industry. These are part of
the cost of operating in the market that they do. In return, pharmaceutical companies
have been granted strong protection of their intellectual property rights which has been
instrumental in the substantial profits they continue to report. As such, it seems
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reasonable to look to them to once again fund an essential element of the system they
operate in.
However, care will have to be taken to insulate academic institutions conducting
this research from the pharmaceutical companies. As such, a tax system based upon
revenues could be imposed on pharmaceutical companies and then dispersed through
government grants to academic institutions. A gradated tax system based on revenues
means that all companies would share the burden proportional to their success and market
share. More importantly, measures that serve to distance the academic institutions
responsible for research means that much of the corrupting influence of profit may be
mitigated. Through this, a reliable source of information about pharmaceuticals may be
created in which the interests of both patients and physicians are protected.

3. Innovation:
As damning as criticism of DTP marketing may seem, there is still a difficult
defense that the pharmaceutical industry may raise in opposition to these claims. It is the
same defense rolled out every time the high profits of the industry are cited as a reason
for regulation of drug pricing. The argument is that high profits are required to
encourage investment in pharmaceutical companies, which is in return required for
investment in R&D. In order for the industry to continue to develop new, innovative
drugs, such high profits must be maintained. 162 Therefore, any reforms that place the
status quo at risk, threaten to stifle innovation. It follows that since DTP marketing is so
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successful at generating high profits for the industry, any measures taken to regulate its
practice may result in a decrease in the development of new, innovative drugs. Even
more, the argument may be extended to claim that the profits generated from these drugs
are funneled back into R&D and helps to drive the development of new, innovative
drugs. Thus, what is at play is a consequentialist claim that while the marketing of metoo drugs may be deceptive and wasteful, it is a necessary evil for the continued
production of new, innovative drugs. As such, it may be argued that by funneling the
profits from me-too drugs back into R&D, the huge potential benefits of newly developed
pharmaceuticals outweighs the costs involved in DTP marketing. However, I will show
that one need not object on these grounds, and instead, that the argument that regulation
will stifle innovation simply does not hold.
The first objection to the argument that regulation will stifle innovation is that it
seems that most of the research on truly innovative drugs does not come from the
pharmaceutical industry itself. According to Marcia Angell, “at least a third of drugs
marketed by the major drug companies are now licensed from universities or small
biotech companies, and these tend to be the most innovative ones.” 163 Further, it seems
that most of the research portion of R&D comes from NIH grants. While this is a claim
that has been frequently cited as justification for government regulation of
pharmaceutical pricing, the industry counters by citing a study conducted by the NIH to
determine the extent to which federal funding of research had led to the development of
new innovative drugs. 164 The study found that of the top 47 drugs on the market in 2001,
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only four could be definitively linked to NIH funding of research. While this has been
widely touted by the industry as proof that most of the truly innovative research stems
from internal R&D by pharmaceutical companies instead of through public funding of the
NIH, in reality the study merely points out that the NIH had not been vigilant in its
tracking of the development of new pharmaceuticals that resulted from federal funding.
As Angell points out, “what the facts really show is that the NIH, in violation of the
Bayh-Dole Act, failed to keep proper records of patenting and licensing
arrangements.” 165 However, even if there is only a limited correlation between NIH
funding and the development of innovative or blockbuster drugs, this does not mean that
NIH funded research has no bearing on the creation of innovative new drugs. It is
important to note that, “even though the NIH spends nearly as much money on research
as does the industry, it concentrates on basic research. Only about 10 percent of clinical
trials are sponsored by the NIH, usually in academic medical centers.” 166 Since the NIH
spends such significant sums on basic research it means that NIH funded research is the
primary source of research into the underlying mechanisms of disease, which is necessary
for the successful development of new treatments. 167 Thus, in one form or another, much
of the cost for initial research into new, innovative drugs is born by public funding
through the NIH, leaving the pharmaceutical industry merely responsible for the
development side of the equation. While development carries the brunt of the cost of
bringing a new drug to market, it seems that most of the truly innovative work takes place
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outside of the industry, calling into question the degree to which decreased profits may
stifle innovation.
Since it seems reasonable to conclude that most of the truly innovative research
comes from outside of the industry, it follows that the majority of internal research is
committed to developing slight alterations on existing drugs in order to develop new metoo’s. Therefore, even if decreased revenues were to affect R&D, it is likely that this
would only significantly impact the development of new me-too drugs. Finally, it seems
apparent that the exorbitant expenditures made on marketing serve primarily to create a
market for me-too drugs. Thus, the increased revenues derived from the success of DTP
marketing serve mainly to increase profits and supply a feedback loop that allocates
revenues into the development of additional me-too drugs, further driving increases in
marketing.
In the end, a brief glance at the allocation of revenues by the top seven
pharmaceutical companies shows that the claim that any loss of revenue will negatively
affect innovation is patently false. Let us not forget that pharmaceutical companies are
immensely successful. This is not an industry struggling to maintain viability. As has
been widely cited, the industry has been the most profitable industry in America for most
of the last decade, only recently slipping to fifth. 168 A 2005 report by Families USA
points out that spending on marketing, advertising, and administration by the top seven
pharmaceutical companies accounts for 32% of company revenues, whereas spending on
R&D was only a meager 14%. Even further, these companies reported 18% of revenue

168

Fortune 500,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/performers/industries/return_on_revenues/index.html
(accessed 3/22/07).

92

as profits. By eliminating most of the expenditures on marketing, an inefficient and
wasteful section of the industry is merely trimmed away. If resource allocation into R&D
does suffer, this will be a decision made by corporations who have concluded that
continued profits at the currently exorbitant levels are more important than the
development of innovative pharmaceuticals. However, even if this is their initial
reaction, it seems obvious that it would only be a temporary outcome of regulation. With
the denial of the industry’s ability to continue to profit from the proliferation of me-too
drugs, the only way for these companies to remain viable will be for them to return to a
primary focus on creating innovative new drugs. Therefore, counter to claims made by
the industry, it is likely that development of innovative new medications will increase in
the long run. In the end, we wind up with a more streamlined, efficient industry with a
much desired shift of focus back to innovation instead of the current impetus to take the
easy route and concentrate on the development of me-too drugs.

4. Only a few Bad Apples?
Finally, it is important to attempt to gauge whether this is truly an industry wide
problem or whether it is only confined to a select few corporations. It is unfortunate that
the studies utilized to substantiate the claims made here do not address this concern.
There is an underlying assumption that all pharmaceutical corporations are guilty of the
problems discussed. The fact that all of the major pharmaceutical companies invest
heavily in DTP marketing seems to substantiate this assumption. 169 Further, all of the
major pharmaceutical companies allow some form of gift giving. Regrettably, based on
169
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the information provided in the studies discussed, there is no way to determine whether
some corporations provide more inaccurate and biased information than others.
However, an examination of the mission statements and codes of conduct of the
top five U.S. pharmaceutical companies does help to give some indication of the
corporate culture of the individual companies. Despite a stated adherence to PhARMA’s
guidelines concerning gift giving, Abbott Laboratories’ code of conduct permits
entertainment of business contacts and generally shows a relaxed attitude to the practices
of gift giving. 170 Similarly, Bristol-Myers Squibb allows for the provision of
entertainment and the furnishing of event tickets. 171 These statements in the code of
conduct of both of these companies contradict restrictions laid out in PhARMA’s
guidelines, which clearly forbid the provision of entertainment and the giving of event
tickets. Thus, these statements seem to send an unclear message to the PSR’s of these
corporations and at least minimally indicates a corporate culture that is more concerned
with the pursuit of profit than the protection of the interests of physicians and patients.
These companies may be compared to Pfizer, who looks to PhARMA’s code as a
guide to interactions with health care professionals. 172 Similarly, Merck cites
PhARMA’s code as the primary guide to interactions, however, Merck makes an
additional effort to emphasize that they, “wish to safeguard the public’s confidence in
physicians to make decisions solely on the basis of patient health.” 173 Further, the widely
discussed case of Merck developing and freely distributing Mectizan as a cure for river
blindness adds further evidence to a corporate culture that is highly committed to patient
170
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care. Therefore, the strong commitment to PhARMA’s guidelines by Pfizer and Merck
may indicate a corporate culture more concerned with the implications of DTP marketing
practices than Abbott Laboratories and Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Finally, Johnson and Johnson goes well beyond a clearly stated adherence to
PhARMA’s guidelines by stating that all guidelines and corporate policies are designed
to “limit even the appearance of improper influence.” 174 This commitment is reinforced
by the fact that they restrict the value of gifts their PSR’s are allowed to give to $25, well
below the industry limit of $100 set by PhARMA. Thus, Johnson & Johnson’s code of
conduct seems to indicate a corporate culture that is admirably concerned with limiting
possible influence through their DTP marketing practices. However, it is important to
note that Johnson & Johnson is the only company out of the top five U.S. pharmaceutical
corporations to enact more restrictive guidelines than those proposed by PhARMA. Even
then, Johnson & Johnson has not voluntarily eliminated any of the practices discussed.
Thus, while some corporations may be more guilty of employing objectionable practices
than others, the assumption that the problems extend across the entire industry seem to be
valid.
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